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A Critique of the New Equal Protection
PREVENTING BALKANIZATION OR
FACILITATING RACIAL DOMINATION:
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION
Darren Lenard Hutchinson

The Supreme Court requires that equal protection plaintiffs
prove defendants acted with discriminatory intent. The intent
rule has insulated from judicial invalidation numerous policies
that harmfully impact racial and ethnic minorities. Court
doctrine also mandates that state actors generally remain
colorblind. The colorblindness doctrine has led to the judicial
invalidation of policies designed to ameliorate the conditions of
racial inequality. Taken together, these two equality doctrines
facilitate racial domination. The Court justifies this outcome on
the ground that the Constitution does not protect “group rights.”
Constitutional law theorists have criticized these aspects of
equal protection doctrine. Recently, however, some theorists
have defended the Court’s discarding of group-based equal
protection. They argue that social justice advocates should
pursue redress for vulnerable groups by asserting dignity-based
liberty claims under the Due Process Clause. In a widely cited
article, Professor Kenji Yoshino argues, in fact, that dignity is
the “New Equal Protection.” Applying insights from “social
capital theory,” Yoshino contends that group-based equal
protection causes “pluralism anxiety”—or a fear of
“balkanization” among the justices. Dignity arguments, by
contrast, do not present such concerns because they rest on
appeals to universal justice.
This Article contests the view that the Court should discontinue
class-based equal protection in order to maintain social
cohesion. Leading social capital theorists find that
multiculturalism, though temporarily divisive (if at all), provides
many long-term benefits. Also, numerous social psychology
studies find that racial and ethnic inequality cause far more
social disruption than group-based identities. This empirical
research also demonstrates that the Court’s equality doctrine
mirrors the views regarding race relations held by most whites,
while contradicting the perspectives of most persons of color.
The enforcement of white majoritarian viewpoints should not
serve as the foundation for an equality doctrine.
Antisubordination theory, by contrast, would provide more
egalitarian outcomes and should inform Court doctrine.

3
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine is in a state of disarray. Critics have condemned the Court for applying counterintuitive
and ahistorical doctrines.1 Some of the harshest critics argue that the
Court has inverted the meaning of equal protection such that it no longer
protects vulnerable classes.2 Others contend that the Court extends protection primarily to advantaged groups.3 In addition, some scholars describe the current equal protection doctrine as undertheorized.4
Recently, some scholars have tried to place the Court’s seemingly
problematic rulings within a broader doctrinal and social context. Specifically, these scholars contend that the Supreme Court is uncomfortable
with the traditional suspect class analysis.5 The Court believes that

1

See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a CoConstitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392 (2000) (criticizing the “class
to classification” shift in equal protection doctrine); Stephen A. Siegel, The
Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist
Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477 (1998) (arguing that application of strict colorblindness doctrine to federal legislation does not comport with historical meaning of equal protection).
2
See Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997)
[hereinafter R. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects] (arguing that
equal protection doctrine functions as a preserver of social privilege and subordination).
3
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than
Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 637–81 (2003) [hereinafter Hutchinson,
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination]. See also R. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 2, at 1114–46 (contending that Equal
Protection privileges reinforce existing sexual and racial hierarchies).
4
See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage
Equality, 113 COLUM. L. R EV. S IDEBAR 204 (2013) (discussing uncertainty
caused by the Court’s use of “animus” in equal protection”); Jane S. Schacter,
Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage
Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s equal
protection cases “simply contain very little by way of exposition.”).
5
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278
(2011) [hereinafter R. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization]; Neil
S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781 (2006) [hereinafter S.
Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans]; Kenji Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection].

2015]

A Critique of the New Equal Protection

5

group-based equal protection leads to balkanization.6 If society splinters
into numerous groups, then this will diminish social cohesion.7
Although the Court has stopped using group-based equal protection,
it has occasionally provided redress to vulnerable classes who have
framed their claims as deprivations of due process.8 These contemporary
due process rulings invalidate state action that deprives individuals of
“dignity.”9 Unlike the suspect class doctrine, the dignity cases do not rest
explicitly on the assertion that certain groups require more rigorous protection by the Court.10 Because dignity rights are universal, they do not
balkanize society or disrupt social cohesion.11
Kenji Yoshino’s article, The New Equal Protection, urges legal
scholars and lawyers to consider using dignity-based arguments rather
than asserting group-based equality claims.12 Yoshino agrees with the
Court’s contention that group-based equal protection divides society, and
he offers literature from social capital theorists—primarily Robert Putnam—to support his arguments.13 Yoshino, however, finds hope for vulnerable classes in dignity-based claims, noting the successful litigation
by petitioners in Lawrence v. Texas and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.14
Although Yoshino’s work has received a tremendous amount of attention from legal scholars, other theorists, such as Rebecca L. Brown,
suggested before Yoshino that liberty and dignity arguments could become the “new equality.”15 Also, Leslie Meltzer Henry’s recent research
demonstrates that the Court has referred to dignity as a basis for deciding
cases since the 1940s.16 Notably, the word “dignity” has recently appeared with greater frequency in Supreme Court opinions.17

6

See sources cited supra note 5.
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 751–76 (discussing
social cohesion, diversity, and equal protection).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 776–85 (discussing new dignity doctrines).
10
Id. at 793 (dignity doctrine “stresses the interests we have in common as
human beings rather than the demographic differences that drive us apart”).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 751–54 (discussing “pluralism anxiety” and borrowing from Robert
Putnam’s research).
14
Id. at 777–81 (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)); id. at
783 (discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992)).
15
Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491
(2002).
16
Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
169, 178–79 (2011) (arguing that over 100 of the 220 Supreme Court cases that
contain the word “dignity” were decided in the last 20 years).
17
Id.
7
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The Court has never stated that it has abandoned the suspect class
doctrine. Silence regarding doctrinal changes, however, does not obscure
reality. In recent case law, equal protection has become a toothless instrument for advocates of social justice and victims of subordination.
The Court has not recognized a new suspect class since 1977.18 Also, the
Court has repeatedly rejected compelling arguments that certain politically and socially vulnerable groups constitute a suspect class.19
The Court has also refused to interpret the Equal Protection Clause
as a legal prohibition of subordination. Instead, the Court narrowly construes equal protection as barring only state action that differentiates on
the basis of prohibited categories.20 The Court adheres to this doctrinal
choice regardless of whether the state action seeks to remedy discrimination, ameliorate subordination, or to promote public benefits, such as
academic diversity.21 Accordingly, the Court’s rulings have severely curtailed the usefulness of the Equal Protection Clause as a source of redress for vulnerable classes.22
Many factors, other than fear of balkanization, could explain the
Court’s dismantling of group-based equal protection. Some critical theorists, for example, contend that the Court has abandoned equal protection
analysis because a majority of the justices either harbor hostility toward
the classes who seek judicial solicitude or generally disfavor civil rights
litigation.23 Other theorists offer less damning reasons, finding, for example, that structural concerns, like federalism and separation of powers,
explain the Court’s rejection of a robust equal protection analysis.24
Structural concerns and judicial bias, however, can operate simultaneously. Throughout American legal history, opponents of racial justice
have frequently invoked states’ rights and federalism concerns in order
to defend racial subordination.25 Furthermore, the Court’s rigid applica18

See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 757.
See infra text accompanying notes 63–77.
20
See infra text accompanying notes 323–30.
21
Id.
22
See R. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 2.
23
See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE
L.J. 1141, 1142 (2002) (suggesting that a “unifying thread behind the Court’s
innovative constitutional case law” is “an anti-antidiscrimination agenda, deeply
felt but as yet poorly theorized”); Girardeau Spann, Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 72 (1995) (arguing that the Court’s decision to negate an affirmative action plan results from “good, old-fashioned racial discrimination, pure and simple”). Cf. Amy Ronner, Scouting for Intolerance: The Dale
Court’s Resurrection of the Medieval Leper, 11 L. & SEXUALITY 53 (2002) (arguing that homophobia impacts Court decisions regarding access to public accommodations by gays and lesbians).
24
Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at
673–76 (discussing institutional concerns and equal protection).
25
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Have the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions Increased Liberty?, 21 HUM. RTS. 3, 9 (2002) (“Segregation and dis19
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tion of strict scrutiny review of race-conscious state action complicates
the structural explanation. According to the Court, racial classifications
are presumably unconstitutional, regardless of context or purpose. This
rigid stance toward state and federal policies undermines structural arguments in defense of a restrained equal protection doctrine.26
While many factors might explain the Court’s retreat from the suspect class doctrine, this Article primarily addresses the balkanization
argument. From an empirical standpoint, legal scholars have persuasively demonstrated that the Court and individual justices have invoked a
fear of balkanization as a reason for rejecting the equal protection claims
of vulnerable classes or for invalidating race-conscious state action.27
This Article does not quarrel with this empirical observation. Instead,
this Article contends that the Court’s stated fear of balkanization requires
closer scrutiny. Scholars who write on this subject tend to take the
Court’s stated anxiety regarding social conflict at face value. For several
reasons, however, legal theorists should subject the Court’s contention to
a more rigorous analysis.
First, the Court fails to make a convincing argument that groupbased equal protection actually causes balkanization. In fact, the Court
has not supported this assertion with empirical research but instead relies
primarily upon its own precedent. Second, even if group-based equal
protection leads to balkanization, this fact alone does not justify withdrawing protection from vulnerable classes. The Court appears to believe
that social cohesion is more important than racial justice, but this argument is hardly beyond debate. Indeed, the historical context in which the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified suggests that racial equality is a paramount interest of states and Congress, and the Supreme Court should
not compromise racial justice in order to appease individuals who support the status quo of racial inequality and for whom racial redress causes tension.

crimination were defended less on the grounds that they were desirable practices, and more in terms of the states’ rights to choose their own laws concerning
race relations.”); Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument:
Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2033 (2003) (“Respect for state sovereignty . . . became a
powerful, publicly acceptable, and legally authoritative framework for expressing the rather perverse desire to abandon the principles of equality implicated in
the War for the sake of reconciliation with southern whites.”); Timothy Zick,
Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental “States’
Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 316 (2004) (observing that “the phrase
‘states’ rights,’ for many, conjures a host of negative associations, including, for
some, virulent racism”).
26
Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at
674–79 (questioning transparency of the Court’s invocation of institutional concerns in equal protection cases).
27
See infra text accompanying notes 39–80.
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Legal scholars who have analyzed the Court’s fear of balkanization
have provided much more substantive justification for abandoning the
suspect class doctrine than the Court’s summary conclusion. Nevertheless, many of these scholars take the Court’s stated fear of social tension
at face value. Yoshino, however, offers empirical research in social capital studies that purportedly demonstrates the balkanizing impact of
group-based identity and the negative impact of multiculturalism.28 A
number of social scientists, however, have conducted empirical studies
that raise serious questions regarding the validity of the claims that social capital theorists make regarding groups and social cohesion.29 The
quality and volume of this research greatly diminishes the usefulness of
social capital theory as a justification for discarding group-based equality.
In addition to questioning social capital theorists’ arguments about
groups and social cohesion, social scientists have conducted numerous
empirical studies that provide a more accurate account of the dynamics
of the Court’s equal protection doctrine, particularly with respect to race
and racism. For example, social psychology studies demonstrate the pervasiveness and resilience of group-based dominance.30 Social psychologists have also conducted studies that demonstrate that whites are more
likely to support colorblindness and assimilation than persons of color
and that persons of color are more likely to support group-based identities and multiculturalism than whites. 31 Thus, to the extent that tension
arises from group-based equality, this tension is one-sided: it largely
causes stress among dominant racial groups.
Furthermore, social psychology research demonstrates that societies
often create or promote legitimizing myths or collective narratives to
justify group domination.32 With respect to race relations in the United
States, colorblindness helps to justify unequal distribution of power
among racial groups.33 If race is an insignificant social characteristic,
then it should not influence social policy.
Also, a recent study indicates that whites believe that they suffer
more discrimination than blacks.34 This legitimizing myth powerfully
impacts the desirability of race-based remedies among whites. If whites
believe that they are racial victims, then they will view policies that seek
to provide additional resources to persons of color as harming whites.
Furthermore, whites tend to believe that the United States offers
equal opportunity for social and economic advancement regardless of

28

See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 751–54.
See infra text accompanying notes 133–80.
30
See infra text accompanying notes 185–95.
31
See infra text accompanying notes 195–204.
32
See infra text accompanying note 195.
33
See infra text accompanying note 207.
34
See infra text accompanying notes 213–27.
29
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race. People of color do not agree with this contention.35 Empirical research finds that people who believe that society has achieved racial
equality are particularly uncomfortable with policies that provide redress
and remediation to persons of color.36 The presumption that the United
States has achieved a post-racial status provides strong support for opponents of race-based remedies. The opponents of race-conscious public
policies contend that persons of color no longer need relief because the
country has eliminated racism.
These empirical findings provide a helpful social context for understanding the Court’s equal protection doctrine. Indeed, as this Article will
demonstrate, the Supreme Court’s equality cases, by impact or intent,
mirror the leading legitimizing myths regarding contemporary race relations in the United States that whites tend to believe. Like the white majority, the Court: (1) eschews multiculturalism and prefers colorblindness; (2) believes that group-based identity and equality claims harm
society and that individualism is preferable; (3) treats racism as largely
vanquished by historical battles and social evolution; and (4) perceives
of whites as vulnerable racial victims.37 Because current equal protection
doctrine mirrors majoritarian perspectives regarding race, legal scholars
should closely scrutinize the justifications the Court provides for its decision making. An equal protection doctrine that facilitates racial domination cannot constitute a fair interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
This Article encourages lawyers and legal scholars to continue articulating equal protection theories that combat racial inequality. Although
dignity-based arguments might offer some relief to subordinate classes,
this doctrine alone cannot accomplish all of the work that a robust application of equal protection could achieve. This Article argues that the
Court should apply an equal protection doctrine designed to invalidate
state action that reinforces the social and political subordination of people of color and other vulnerable classes. Such a doctrine would welcome multiculturalism and group-based identity as necessary elements of
a just society. This doctrine would also recognize that the appropriateness of colorblindness or race-consciousness depends upon context. Policies that seek to ameliorate racial inequality do not presumptively violate the Constitution even if they utilize racial classifications. On the
other hand, state action that reinforces racial hierarchy violates the Constitution even if it is facially neutral with respect to race. Furthermore,
the “newer” equal protection that this Article advocates would rest on the
empirically demonstrable reality that race remains a substantial barrier to
equality in the United States and that whiteness remains a privileged category.

35

See infra text accompanying notes 205–06.
See infra text accompanying notes 205–12.
37
See infra text accompanying notes 227–69.
36
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This doctrine would not mean that all whites are wrong and that all
people of color are right. In fact, many whites support multiculturalism,
while many people of color do not. Many whites support group-based
equality, while many people of color do not. Instead, this doctrine would
not structure equal protection to mirror the beliefs that socially dominant
groups hold regarding the status of race relations. Thus, it would not
privilege any racial group. Instead, it would prioritize equality enhancement over the preservation of hierarchy. This goal does not offend equal
protection.
This Article evolves in four principal Parts. Part I generally analyzes
and accepts the empirical claim that the Court has indeed pointed to a
fear of balkanization in order to justify a retreat from group-based equal
protection. First, Part I demonstrates that the balkanization discourse has
appeared frequently in three areas of equal protection case law, namely,
the application of colorblindness and antidifferentiation; the requirement
of discriminatory intent in equal protection doctrine; and the Court’s refusal to recognize additional suspect classes despite the persuasiveness
of claims some vulnerable groups have made. Part I then briefly examines the historical use of dignity arguments in judicial opinions and analyzes the recent escalation of such arguments. Next, Part I examines the
claim that the Court has moved to dignity-based due process claims and
away from group-based equal protection claims because it fears balkanization. Finally, Part I considers how social capital theory has informed
legal scholarship that supports dignity-based due process claims over
group-based equal protection.
Part II considers whether social capital literature justifies the Court’s
concern with balkanization and its retreat from group-based equal protection. Part II first examines social capital literature that finds cultural
pluralism harmful to society, but argues that this literature does not justify the Court’s fear of balkanization and its movement away from the
suspect class doctrine. Robert Putnam, a leading social capital theorist
(and the scholar whose work most influenced Yoshino’s The New Equal
Protection), forcefully rejects the argument that his scholarship compels
the rejection of group-based equal protection and the end of policies designed to promote racial diversity and equality. Instead, Putnam contends
that racial and ethnic diversity engenders many important societal benefits. While Putnam has retreated somewhat from his claims regarding the
destabilizing impact of multiculturalism, he now argues that a younger
generation of Americans has found a common identity and is reengaging
in political and civic activity—despite racial and ethnic differences. Part
II then examines numerous social science studies that debunk or raise
questions regarding Putnam’s methodology and findings as well as the
research of other social capital theorists.
Part III considers whether the Court’s evasion of the suspect class
doctrine prevents balkanization or facilitates racial subordination. Part
III first analyzes the work of social psychologists, who, unlike social
capital theorists, have studied the relationship of groups and society for
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nearly a century. Part III demonstrates that many social psychologists
consider group-based identity an essential dimension of human societies.
Furthermore, group-based domination has always existed in human societies. Part III then discusses various empirical studies regarding the substance of contemporary race relations in the United States. Specifically,
Part III examines social psychology studies that find that whites are
much more likely than persons of color to embrace colorblindness over
multiculturalism and that persons of color are much more likely than
whites to embrace multiculturalism over colorblindness. Furthermore,
empirical research demonstrates that whites tend to support ideals of individualism over group identity, while persons of color favor group identity over individualism. Part III also demonstrates that whites tend to
believe that racism no longer remains a significant barrier to social and
economic advancement, while people of color believe that race is a substantial obstacle to equal opportunity. Next, Part III analyzes empirical
research that finds that whites believe that they are racial victims—
possibly to a greater extent than persons of color—but that people of
color do not share this opinion. Part III also discusses how whites’ embrace of these positions regarding racism helps to justify pervasive racial
inequality. Part III then compares dominant group ideas regarding race
with the Court’s equal protection doctrine to demonstrate that the Court
has implemented each of the four system-preserving beliefs that whites
have regarding race relations. In other words, the Court’s equal protection doctrine enforces dominant racial perspectives that legitimize racial
inequality. The incorporation of these viewpoints into equal protection
doctrine facilitates racial inequality in two ways. First, it justifies the
judicial invalidation of state action that seeks to reduce racial hierarchy.
Second, it shields from judicial invalidation facially neutral laws or policies that impose serious harms upon persons of color.
Part IV advocates for the construction of a “newer” equal protection
that actually protects vulnerable classes rather than facilitating racial inequality. Part IV maps out the contours of this doctrine, observing that it
would rest on a firm empirical understanding of United States race relations, including the value of multiculturalism, the inevitability and importance of group identity, the persistence of racism and racial inequality, and the privileged status of whiteness. While this newer equal
protection theory would not seek to supplant dignity claims, this Article
does recognize the limits of dignity arguments and the need for advocates of social justice to utilize equal protection alongside other types of
legal doctrines.
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I. BALKANIZATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Several legal scholars contend that the Court’s fear of balkanization
has impacted equal protection doctrine.38 This Part finds substantial support for these scholars’ empirical claim that evading balkanization has
become a central component of equal protection doctrine. Some of these
scholars have offered empirical research to support the Court’s fear that
group-based equal protection polarizes society, including studies conducted by social capital theorists, particularly Robert Putnam (whose
research has influenced scholars within and outside of the legal academy).39 Putnam contends that multiculturalism diminishes civic engagement and trust among members of society and causes people to withdraw
into themselves. Putnam’s research, if accurate, could potentially justify
the Court’s retreat from the suspect class doctrine.40
A. Balkanization: The Empirical Claim
The Court has indisputably cited a concern with balkanization as a
reason to reject group-based equal protection claims. This fear of social
tension has justified the Court’s application of a very rigid strict scrutiny
of state action that uses racial classifications to remedy current and historical discrimination or that seeks to promote a public good, such as
diversity in higher education. The Court has also invoked balkanization
or opposition to group remedies as a basis for requiring discriminatory
intent in equal protection cases and for declining to find any new suspect
classes.
1. Colorblindness, Affirmative Action, and Balkanization
Members of the Court began referring to balkanization in the first
case the Court decided that challenged an affirmative action program. In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Powell rejected
the university’s argument that the Court should not apply strict scrutiny
to its race-based affirmative action program.41 The university argued that
because whites do not constitute a politically vulnerable class, extraordi-

38

See R. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 5;
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5.
39
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5. See Robert D. Putnam,
E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and the Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137 (2007) [hereinafter Putnam, E Pluribus Unum].
40
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39.
41
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288 (1978) (writing for
the plurality and disagreeing with the university’s assertion “that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny to the special admissions program because
white males, such as respondent, are not a ‘discrete and insular minority’ requiring extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
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nary intervention by the Court into the political process that led to the
policy was not warranted.42
Powell, however, argued that the Constitution forecloses a “twoclass theory” of equal protection that treats blacks as “special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.”43 Although the Court had previously relied upon footnote four of Carolene
Products v. United States as a justification for applying strict scrutiny to
policies that harm discrete and insular minorities, Powell argued that all
racial classifications should receive strict judicial scrutiny.44
Powell defended his position, in part, on the grounds that if the
Court were to determine which racial groups lacked political power, this
would inevitably lead to competing and shifting claims of discrimination
by numerous groups, which would require an analysis beyond the competence of the Court—even if “socially desirable.”45 According to Powell, toleration of some race-based policies and intolerance of others could
“exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms, rather than alleviate them.”46
During the Rehnquist Court, several justices, including Justices
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, contended that racial classifications divide society. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., for example,
O’Connor argued that racial classifications can “lead to a politics of racial hostility” and that the dissent’s “watered-down version of equal protection review, effectively assures that race will always be relevant in
American life.”47 O’Connor also suggested that even if the Court should
more rigorously protect politically vulnerable classes under a theory of
equal protection, then this case would qualify for strict scrutiny because
Richmond blacks occupied five of nine seats on the city council and constituted fifty percent of the local population.48 As a result, blacks dominated whites, rendering them socially and politically vulnerable.49
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Croson expresses an unmistakable
belief that race-conscious remedial policies cause racial divisions:

42

Id. at 290.
Id. at 295.
44
Id. at 291 (“Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”); United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
45
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 297. See also id. at 295–96 (“[T]he white ‘majority’ itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a
history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.
Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding
judicial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then
the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon
Protestants.”).
46
Id. at 298–99
47
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 495 (1989).
48
Id. at 495.
49
Id. at 495–96.
43
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Racial preferences appear to “even the score” (in some
small degree) only if one embraces the proposition that
our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races,
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a
black man should be compensated for by discriminating
against a white.50
Justice Thomas makes a similar observation in his concurring opinion in Adarand Constructors v. Peña.51 Thomas describes affirmative
action as “racial paternalism” and asserts that such policies have disastrous effects upon blacks and social harmony.52 According to Thomas,
policies of affirmative action:
[E]ngender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they
have been wronged by the government’s use of race.
These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to
adopt an attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences.53
As Reva Siegel has argued, the Court’s contention that race-based
state action divides society has continued during the Roberts era.54 In
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1, Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion culls numerous quotations from Supreme Court precedent in order to portray governmental
usage of race for socially productive purposes as promoting the same
divisions, stereotypes, and harms caused by Jim Crow-era segregation.55
And while Justice Kennedy disagrees with the plurality’s conclusion that
states do not have a compelling interest in remedying the geographic
isolation of students of color, he argues that racial classifications can
diminish social cohesion:
Governmental classifications that command people to
march in different directions based on racial typologies
can cause a new divisiveness. The practice can lead to
corrosive discourse, where race serves not as an element
of our diverse heritage but instead as a bargaining chip
in the political process.56

50

Id. at 528 (Scalia J., concurring).
Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
52
Id. at 240.
53
Id. at 241.
54
See R. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 5
(discussing the use of balkanization discourse in C.J. Roberts Court opinions).
55
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
741–42 (2007).
56
Id. at 797.
51

2015]

A Critique of the New Equal Protection

15

Kennedy describes race as a political trump card, rather than a basis for
distributive justice. Although Kennedy strives to find a middle ground
between the dissent and the plurality, he ultimately concludes that governmental policies that utilize racial categories most likely harm, rather
than improve, society.
As the Court’s statements regarding social disruption indicate, the
justices generally disapprove of policies that treat people as members of
groups rather than as individuals.57 The Court demonstrates its disdain
for group identity by holding, particularly in affirmative action cases,
that the Constitution secures individual rights—not group rights.58 If the
Court refuses to validate group-based identity and rights, then, presumably, it can prevent the erosion that racial categorization causes.
2. Discriminatory Intent Rule
To prevail on an equal protection claim, the Court requires plaintiffs
to demonstrate that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Generally, when courts apply this rule, they do not find evidence of discriminatory impact probative of discriminatory intent. Unless the pattern of
discrimination is unmistakably a reflection of an improper motive, plaintiffs will need to provide some other circumstantial evidence of defendants’ intent to discriminate.59
The Court has offered several justifications for requiring discriminatory intent, one being that an impact standard would raise substantial
institutional concerns, such as separation of powers and federalism.60
Because numerous facially neutral policies impact vulnerable racial
groups, the Court must require additional evidence of intent in order to
avoid aggrandizing the judiciary at the expense of state legislatures and
Congress.61
57

See S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, supra note 5
(linking rigid analysis in affirmative action cases with Court’s disdain for policies that overly emphasize group membership).
58
Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 580–81 (2002) (discussing Court’s
references to “group rights” in affirmative action cases).
59
See generally Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV.
1065 (1998) (analyzing the discriminatory intent requirement); David A.
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935
(1989).
60
Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at
677 (discussing institutional concerns and the discriminatory intent rule).
61
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (“A rule that a statute
designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another would be
far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes
that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the
more affluent white.”).
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The Court also applies the discriminatory intent rule because it has
found that the Equal Protection Clause does not protect group rights.
Although the Court has not analyzed this issue at length, several scholars
have observed that disparate impact theories rest most comfortably on a
constitutional theory of group rights.62 Because the Court, however, believes that group identity and group-based equal protection divide society, it has generally rejected disparate impact as proof of discrimination in
equal protection cases.63 Even though equal protection plaintiffs who
present evidence of discriminatory impact do not formally plead theories
of collective rights, the Court, nonetheless, emphasizes the need for individualized proof of discrimination.64
3. The End of Suspect Classes
The Court’s fear of balkanization has led to a third doctrinal development: the demise of the suspect class doctrine. Two doctrinal moves
effectively ended the suspect class doctrine. First, the Court has declined
to recognize new suspect classes, despite compelling circumstances that
could have justified expansion of the doctrine. Second, the Court has
applied heightened scrutiny symmetrically, extending heightened scrutiny to whites and persons of color and women and men, despite the
groups having very different histories with respect to group domination.
These two developments both derive from the Court’s fear of balkanization.
a. Failure to Recognize New Suspect Classes
The Court has often, though not consistently, used a four-factor test
to determine whether a group qualifies as a suspect class. Specifically,
the Court considers whether the group: (1) has suffered from a history of
discrimination; (2) lacks political power; (3) suffers discrimination due
to an immutable characteristic; and (4) experiences discrimination on the
basis of a trait that bears no relationship to its members’ ability to per-

62

See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 108, 141–46 (1976) (advocating group-based equal protection doctrine in order to accommodate claims of discriminatory effects); Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 765 (recognizing that pluralism anxiety
explains the discriminatory intent rule, in part, though not explicitly mentioned
in Court rulings and observing that once the Court “imported this equal protection framework into the free exercise context . . . the Justices did avert to such
anxiety”).
63
See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 317 n.39 (1987) (“Finally,
in our heterogeneous society the lower courts have found the boundaries of race
and ethnicity increasingly difficult to determine.”).
64
See id. at 292 (“Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause,
McCleskey must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.”).
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form or contribute to society.65 This test, first detailed in Justice Brennan’s opinion for the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson, draws from the
political process theory alluded to in footnote four of Carolene Products.66 The Court uses this test to determine whether it should apply a
more stringent level of review when certain classes, due to their political
powerlessness, cannot protect themselves from abusive political decision
making. 67 Dominant classes, by contrast, do not warrant heightened protection because they do not experience subjugation in the political process.68
The Court has inconsistently applied the Frontiero test, and many of
the component factors remain undertheorized.69 Most importantly, however, the Court has effectively discontinued using this doctrine to find
new suspect classes. Many scholars have persuasively argued that the
suspect class doctrine now operates as a gatekeeper instead of a formula
used to determine which groups suffer from political oppression.70

65
See Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old Problem, New Tactic:
Making The Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based
on Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1481–82 (2008) (“[The
heightened scrutiny] factors include (1) the possession of an immutable characteristic by members of the protected class, (2) the existence of a history of discrimination against members of the class, (3) the relevance of the characteristic
to legitimate decision making, and (4) the political power of the class.”) (citation omitted).
66
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–88 (1973) (plurality
opinion) (arguing that women constitute a suspect class); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (suggesting a more “searching judicial inquiry” of laws that stem from “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities”).
67
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 135–79 (1980) (considering prejudice against “minority” groups a political process failure).
68
Id.
69
See Jane Schacter, Ely at the Alter: Political Process Theory Through the
Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1376 (2011) (“In the
course of making political powerlessness an element of equal protection doctrine, the justices have had very little to say about what the idea of political
powerlessness means and requires, and even less to say about the underlying
idea of democracy informing the Court’s assessment of the political process.
Supreme Court opinions simply contain very little by way of exposition.”);
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 565 (1998)
[hereinafter Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias] (arguing that the standards for
heightened scrutiny “are applied inconsistently across contexts”).
70
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias, supra note 69, at 558 (arguing that the
Court uses the suspect class doctrine in order to “limit[] the number of groups
deemed to deserve the courts’ solicitude”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Not
Without Political Power: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection, and the Suspect
Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 993 (2014) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Not
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The Court has cited numerous structural reasons, including federalism and separation of powers, to justify its refusal to find new suspect
classes. Once the Court decides that a group constitutes a suspect class,
this finding would imply the judicial invalidation of most or all state and
federal action that discriminates against the group.71 The suspect class
doctrine, if successfully asserted by a particular class, would give the
Court enormous oversight of state and federal laws that discriminate
against that group. To prevent such augmentation of the judicial power,
the Court applies the suspect class doctrine with great caution—
arguably, to the point of discarding the doctrine altogether.
Institutional concerns, however, do not fully explain the Court’s refusal to find new suspect classes. Instead, the Court has also expressed
discomfort with group equality claims as a basis for denying suspect
class status to certain groups—even when they have made a persuasive
case for application of heightened protection. In Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, for example, the Court reviewed a Fifth Circuit ruling that
held that a class of developmentally disabled persons qualifies as a quasi-suspect class, entitled to intermediate scrutiny.72 The Court reversed
the portion of the appellate ruling that found quasi-suspect status, although it affirmed the judgment invalidating the discriminatory municipal
ordinance.73 The Court expressed a concern that creating a new suspect
class would lead to a proliferation of group-based equality claims and
create an unmanageable situation for the Court.74
Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
the Court refused to treat people who live in poor school districts as a
suspect class.75 The Court held that numerous difficulties would arise
from an effort to recognize this class as a group and doing so could lead
to an endless array of claims for group redress.76
Without Political Power] (discussing gatekeeping nature of suspect class doctrine).
71
See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 444–45 (1985)
(expressing reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny due to chilling effect on
federal legislation).
72
See id. at 432.
73
See generally id.
74
See id. at 445–46 (“Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of
Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of
other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from
others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and
who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large.
One need mention in this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do
so.”).
75
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
76
Id. at 27–28 (“Assuming a perfect correlation between district property
wealth and expenditures from top to bottom, the disadvantaged class might be
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Ironically, in Bakke, Justice Powell, who strongly condemned groupbased equal protection in the context of race, explicitly endorsed the
class approach for “other” groups seeking judicial solicitude.77 Nonetheless, the Court has effectively retreated from this doctrine as well, leaving many vulnerable groups susceptible to majoritarian abuses.
b. Class-to-Classification Shift
The Court’s symmetrical application of strict and heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases also marks a retreat from the suspect class
doctrine. Rather than protecting vulnerable classes, such as blacks or
women, from discrimination, contemporary equal protection disallows
the use of certain classifications, like race or sex, by state actors.78 The
class-to-classification shift in equal protection doctrine demonstrates that
the Court has abandoned the suspect class doctrine literally and substantively. Nonetheless, the Court still has not announced a standard for determining whether a classification on its own is constitutionally suspicious. Instead, the Court merely points to the historical subordination of
women and persons of color to explain why it should follow a classification approach.79 In other words, the Court extends judicial solicitude to
persons, like white men, who have not suffered historical or present-day
subordination, because the historical subjugation of people of color and
women makes race and sex inappropriate bases for public policy. That a
long history of racial oppression justifies invalidation of policies designed to alleviate the harms of this history offers compelling evidence
that equal protection no longer provides justice for racial and ethnic minorities.80

viewed as encompassing every child in every district except the district that has
the most assessable wealth and spends the most on education.”); id. at 28
(“However described, it is clear that appellees’ suit asks this Court to extend its
most exacting scrutiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a
large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.”).
77
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (arguing that
the suspect class factors “may be relevant in deciding whether or not to add new
types of classifications to the list of ‘suspect’ categories” but that “[r]acial and
ethnic classifications . . . are subject to stringent examination without regard to
these additional characteristics.”) (citations omitted).
78
See Nice, supra note 1, at 1400.
79
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 213–18 (1995)
(discussing numerous cases involving discrimination against persons of color to
justify applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications).
80
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Co. 488 U.S. 469, 528–29 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]t is a welcome symbol of racial progress when
the former capital of the Confederacy acts forthrightly to confront the effects of
racial discrimination in its midst” but lamenting that “[a] majority of this Court
holds . . . that the Equal Protection Clause . . . blocks Richmond’s initiative”);
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B. Dignity and the Supreme Court
Currently, equal protection doctrine denies substantial protection to
vulnerable social groups. Nevertheless, in a few recently decided cases,
dignity-based claims brought under the Due Process Clause have offered
some hope to disadvantaged groups, particularly LGBT individuals. The
successful use of dignity arguments in social justice litigation has generated a substantial amount of academic literature, which this section analyzes.
1. Historical Usage of “Dignity” in Supreme Court Opinions
Although recent academic literature regarding the Court’s use of
dignity analysis to decide due process claims might leave the impression
that it is a novel judicial development, dignity-based outcomes have a
long historical presence in Supreme Court cases. Leslie Meltzer Henry’s
work, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, reveals that the word “dignity” appears in over nine hundred Supreme Court opinions.81 Furthermore, the
Court has made appeals to dignity in numerous contexts outside of the
Due Process Clause.82 And while many theorists have criticized the Supreme Court for failing to provide a concrete definition of dignity, the
Court has relied upon this concept with greater frequency in recent case
law.83
Rejecting the essentialist and reductionist approaches she sees in
current scholarship, Henry canvasses all of the references to dignity in
Supreme Court cases in order to determine the different concepts the
Court has used dignity to express. Henry agrees that the Court has used
dignity-based doctrines to protect liberty interests, such as abortion
rights and sexual conduct, but the Court has also made appeals to dignity
in order to defend “institutional status,” “equality,” “personal integrity,”
and “collective virtue.”84 Thus, as Henry concludes, dignity has a contingent meaning, and the Court uses the term primarily to emphasize or
“give weight to the substantive interests that are implicated in specific
contexts.”85

id. at 562 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I never thought that I would live to see
the day when the city of Richmond, Virginia, the cradle of the Old Confederacy,
sought on its own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of persistent discrimination. . . . Yet this Court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes
down Richmond’s efforts as though discrimination had never existed or was not
demonstrated in this particular litigation.”).
81
Henry, supra note 16, at 178.
82
Id. at 172–73.
83
Id. at 171.
84
Id. at 190.
85
Id.

2015]

A Critique of the New Equal Protection

21

2. Contemporary Dignity Cases and Academic Reaction
Henry’s work demonstrates that among legal theorists, the Court’s
use of “dignity” in sovereign immunity cases has received the most
analysis.86 A more recent strand of scholarship discusses the use of dignity in liberty-based due process litigation.87 This set of cases arguably
constitutes a new equal protection doctrine because they accomplish
some equality norms in the absence of a formal equal protection claim.88
The linkage of liberty and dignity has a very long presence in United
States political theory, and, more generally, in Greek and Roman philosophy.89 With respect to modern history, the first Supreme Court decision
to merge liberty and dignity is Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which invalidated numerous provisions of
a Pennsylvania antiabortion law.90 The Court also emphasized dignity in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.91 The joint
opinion in Casey describes dignity in very broad terms:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.
Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Our
86

Id. at 175 n.32 (citing many sources).
Id. at 206–12. This Article assumes for the sake of argument and ease of
presentation that the Court has crafted a dignity doctrine. The better argument,
however, is that the dignity cases represent a compromise orchestrated by Justice Kennedy, whose relative centrism typically controls the outcome of close
cases, such as equal protection and liberty adjudication. See R. Siegel, From
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 5 (arguing that judicial centrists
show the most concern regarding balkanization).
88
See Henry, supra note 16, at 203, 204–05. See also Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 783 (discussing equality dimensions of recent
dignity cases).
89
See Henry, supra note 16, at 206 (“The notion that humans deserve respect as free, autonomous, sovereign, and self-determined agents is so entrenched in American political liberalism that it appears self-evident. Its origins
can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome, where the Stoics were among
the first thinkers to connect humans’ unique capacity for moral reasoning with
their dignity.”) (citations omitted).
90
See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). See also Henry, supra
note 16, at 174 n.25 (“[f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more
properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a
woman’s decision . . . whether to end a pregnancy.”) (quoting Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 772) (ellipses in original).
91
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
87
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precedents “have respected the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.” These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State.92
The Supreme Court, however, has subsequently constrained the
reach of Casey. In Washington v. Glucksberg, for example, the Court
held that the Due Process Clause does not secure a right to physicianassisted suicide.93 The Court specifically rejected the respondents’ use of
Casey to justify recognition of such a right.94 Lawrence v. Texas, which
found that “liberty” includes a right to engage in consensual sodomy,
renewed scholarly arguments that the Court had created a new, possibly
expansive, doctrine that combines concepts of liberty with dignity.95
C. Dignity, Equality, and Pluralism Anxiety
Although many scholars have discussed the Court’s fear of balkanization and the development of a dignity-based liberty doctrine, Kenji
Yoshino offers a unique perspective to these debates by merging the issues into one analysis. Yoshino contends that the Court’s fear of balkanization—or pluralism anxiety—caused the shift to dignity-based claims.96
Yoshino argues that dignity claims can avoid the balkanization associated with group-based equal protection because these claims rest on uni-

92

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
94
Id. at 703 (“[A]lthough Casey recognized that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, it does
not follow that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so
protected. Casey did not suggest otherwise.”) (internal citations omitted).
95
See Henry, supra note 16 at 211 & n.215 (citing Nelson Lund & John O.
McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas, and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555,
1583 (2004)); Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 778–81.
96
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 776 (“The Court has
used liberty analysis to mitigate its curtailment of group-based equality analysis.
This movement toward liberty has not secured all the ends that would have been
available under an extension of the traditional group-based equal protection
analysis. Nonetheless, progressives should pay more heed to this move toward
liberty. The liberty-based dignity claim has been the Court’s way of splitting the
difference between a direct extension of equality analysis and its absolute foreclosure.”).
93
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versality and commonality, rather than social distinctions.97 Dignity arguments unite, rather than divide society because everyone has a right to
privacy; everyone has a right to marry; everyone has a right to engage in
consensual sexual behavior, and so forth.
1. Social Science and Pluralism Anxiety
To document the harmful impact of pluralism, Yoshino relies primarily upon the work of Robert Putnam, a Harvard political scientist, who
has written extensively on social capital.98 Scholars have invoked social
capital to describe several different concepts.99 In Bowling Alone, Putnam’s first sustained examination of social capital, he uses the term to
describe the macro-benefits of engaged social interaction:
Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects
and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals—
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense social capital is closely related to what some have called “civil virtue.” The difference is that “social capital” calls
attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social
relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital.100
Civic participation, measured by voting rates, community-group
membership, social engagement with coworkers, philanthropy, and other
variables, concerns Putnam the most. His research finds that the level of
civic participation in the United States has declined precipitously since
World War II.101 Putnam contends that the decline in civic participation
will harm society, because social interaction through civic engagement
engenders numerous important social benefits, including improvements
in education and child welfare, reduction of crime, greater economic
prosperity, more health and happiness, and greater democratic participation.102
97

Id. at 793 (“The new equal protection paradigm stresses the interests we
have in common as human beings rather than the demographic differences that
drive us apart. In this sense, the shift from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ equal protection
could be seen as a movement from group-based civil rights to universal human
rights.”).
98
See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) [hereinafter PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE].
99
Id. at 18–20.
100
Id. at 19.
101
Id. at 31–147.
102
Id. at 287–350.
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Bowling Alone attributes much of the post-war decline in civic engagement to broader structural and cultural changes in the United States,
such as “pressures of time and money” on “two-career families”; “suburbanization, commuting, and sprawl”; “electronic entertainment,” especially television; and a generic category of “generational change” (which
Putnam concludes overlaps with the ascendency of television).103
In Bowling Alone, Putnam rejects the notion that racism caused the
massive reduction in civic engagement since the 1950s.104 Recently,
however, Putnam links the reduction in civic engagement with the increasing pluralism of the United States population. In a very controversial and highly criticized article, Putnam argues that greater ethnic and
racial diversity reduces the general level of trust in society—a precondition of civic engagement—and that this reduction occurs within and
across social groups.105 According to Putnam, multiculturalism or social
pluralism causes individuals of all races to “hunker down” or “to pull in
like a turtle.”106
It is important to note that Putnam concedes that greater diversity—
especially from immigration—produces very important social benefits,
including greater creativity, rapid economic growth, a new work force to
replace a generation of retirees, and improvement of the standard of living in developing countries through North–South remittances.107 Nonetheless, Putnam argues that the negative dimensions of immigration and
multiculturalism should cause alarm. In addition to causing social isolation, racial and ethnic diversity, according to Putnam, correlate with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

103

Lower confidence in local government, local leaders, and the local news media
Lower political efficacy—that is, confidence in
one’s own political influence
Lower frequency of registering to vote, but more interest and knowledge about politics and more participation in protest marches and social reform groups
Less expectation that others will cooperate to solve
dilemmas of collective action
Less likelihood of working on a community project
Lower likelihood of giving to charity or volunteering
Fewer close friends and confidants
Less happiness and lower perceived quality of life

Id. at 189–284.
Id. at 279–80 (discussing racism as a possible factor in the reduction of
social capital and rejecting this possibility for several reasons).
105
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39.
106
Id. at 149.
107
Id. at 140–41.
104
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More time spent watching television and more
agreement that “television is my most important
form of entertainment”108

Finally, Putnam suggests that, in spite of the short-term harms that
diversity causes, the United States should not seek to “bleach out” all
traces of difference.109 Instead, he argues that the United States should
tolerate diversity, but manage its potentially negative effects by constructing a more flexible and expansive understanding of what it means
to be an American.110
2. Social Capital and Dignity Theorists
Yoshino explicitly relies upon Putnam’s arguments in order to promote the use of dignity doctrine as a substitute for group-based equality
claims.111 Yoshino contends that dignity arguments could help litigants
overcome the limitations of the Court’s shrinking equal protection doctrine, including the class-to-classification shift, discriminatory intent
rule, and judicial rejection of legislative efforts to remedy discrimination
against vulnerable groups.112
Other scholars have criticized the suspect class doctrine for causing
division and balkanization, without citing social capital theory.113 In addition, some theorists have explored the connections between dignity and
equality without suggesting that one form of analysis should replace the
other.114 With respect to using social capital theory to examine equal protection and dignity doctrine, Yoshino’s work seems to stand alone. Although social capital theory makes some very provocative claims about
the value of civic participation in the United States, this research does
not justify judicial abandonment of the suspect class doctrine and groupbased equal protection. Part II elaborates on this position.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION, DIGNITY, AND GROUPS
This Part argues that, for several reasons, social capital theory does
not justify the Court’s retreat from group-based equal protection. First,
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Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 164.
110
Id. at 163–64 (“[M]y hunch is that at the end we shall see that the challenge is best met not by making ‘them’ like ‘us’, but rather by creating a new,
more capacious sense of ‘we’, a reconstruction of diversity that does not bleach
out ethnic specificities, but creates overarching identities that ensure that those
specificities do not trigger the allergic, ‘hunker down’ reaction.”).
111
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 752–54, 774–75,
792–93, 796.
112
Id. at 776–87.
113
EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS,
LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION (1999).
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Henry, supra note 16, at 199–205.
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Putnam does not believe that this scholarship compels a retreat from
group-based equal protection or from group-based identity. Also, social
capital theorists, including Putnam, have discussed the benefits of racial
and ethnic diversity at length. Furthermore, the social capital literature
has generated an avalanche of academic criticism that severely undermines its credibility as a basis for constructing judicial doctrines or as a
prescription for managing racial and ethnic diversity.
A. Social Capital Literature Does Not Justify a New Equal Protection
Supreme Court justices and several legal scholars contend that traditional class-based equal protection doctrine divides society and leads to
balkanization. On the surface, social capital literature provides some
support for this position. For several reasons, however, social capital
theory does not justify the Court’s retreat from class-based equal protection.
1. Robert Putnam Does Not Believe His Scholarship Justifies
Opposition to Group-Based Egalitarian Policies
In Fisher v. University of Texas, the Court remanded the case to the
Fifth Circuit with instructions to apply the correct level of scrutiny to a
university’s affirmative action program.115 Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan
Thernstrom, Althea K. Nagai, and Russell Nieli filed an amicus brief in
favor of the petitioner Abigail Fisher and in opposition to the university’s
use of affirmative action.116 The brief challenges the argument made by
the respondent, and validated by Court precedent, that racial diversity
fosters cross-racial understanding and other compelling benefits for society.117 To support this position, the Thernstrom brief cites to Putnam’s
article E Pluribus Unum. The brief relies upon Putnam’s findings regarding the impact of racial diversity upon society, including that it lowers
trust and erodes civic participation.118

115

133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
Brief of Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan Thernstrom, Althea K. Nagai, and
Russell Nieli as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.,
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 13 (“[P]eople of different racial and ethnic groups have a harder
time getting along with one another—and trusting one another—than do people
of the same race or same ethnic group. The more numerous the members of the
outsider group present, and the more contact people have with them, the greater
the level of inter-group distrust.”) (citations omitted); id. at 13 (“In racially and
ethnically diverse communities, there is a decline in social solidarity, community activities, and general neighborliness as people tend to withdraw into themselves and become more isolated and alienated from others nearby. In Putnam’s
words, people under such circumstances ‘hunker down’ and ‘pull in like a turtle.’”) (quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39, at 149).
116
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The Thernstrom brief motivated Putnam to submit his own brief in
favor of the University of Texas.119 Putnam contends that the Thernstrom
brief misuses his research by selectively quoting a few observations that
support Fisher’s position, while ignoring his conclusion that ethnic and
racial diversity is inevitable and that it produces long-term benefits for
society.120 Although Putnam does not specifically examine whether the
suspect class doctrine causes racial friction, he endorses affirmative action policies, notwithstanding the fact that these policies treat whites and
persons of color disparately and rest upon a recognition of group-based
differences:
[P]olicies that seek a broad diversity, including racial
and ethnic diversity, in educational institutions, such as
those in use at UT, hold great promise in overcoming
any potential short-run negative effects of diversity identified in the Thernstrom amici brief. A nation that is inevitably and increasingly diverse benefits from policies
that promote social solidarity and trust through shared
experiences and creation of a more inclusive social identity.121
In addition, Putnam has anticipated arguments that many progressives have made which link social capital with historical subordination.122 Tight, close-knit, homogeneous, and civically engaged communities helped to produce and sustain sexist, racist, xenophobic, classist, and
sexually repressive policies.123 Conceding this reality, Putnam considers
whether a necessary tension exists between social capital and equality.
He forcefully rejects this position:
Does this logic mean that we must in some fundamental sense choose between community and equality?
The empirical evidence on recent trends is unambiguous: No. Community and equality are mutually reinforcing, not mutually incompatible. Social capital and economic equality moved in tandem through most of the
119

Brief for Robert D. Putnam as Amicus Curiae Supporting the University
of Texas at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) [hereinafter Putnam Brief] (“Dr. Putnam did not seek to become involved in this case, but because his findings on diversity were inaccurately and selectively described in
the amicus curiae brief submitted by Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan Thernstrom,
Althea K. Nagai, and Russell Nieli . . . he respectfully submits this brief to clarify the record.”).
120
Id. at 4–5.
121
Id. at 21–22.
122
See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 358–59. See also infra
text accompanying notes 168–79 (discussing role of social capital in fostering
historical injustices).
123
See infra text accompanying notes 168–79.
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twentieth century. In terms of the distribution of wealth
and income, America in the 1950s and 1960s was more
egalitarian than it had been in more than a century. . . .
[T]hose same decades were also the high point of social
connectedness and civic engagement. Record highs in
equality in social capital coincided.124
Although Putnam equivocates on the causal relationship between equality and social capital, he nonetheless does not believe that egalitarian
claims defeat social capital or vice versa.125
Although the Supreme Court finds that affirmative action policies
cause social division and balkanization, Putnam, one of the leading authors in the field of social capital, believes that promoting diversity and
group interaction will actually lead to greater social solidarity and cohesion in the long-term and that “the race-conscious admissions policy that
UT has implemented” will help facilitate the long-term management of
racial difference.126 Putnam rejects the balkanization rhetoric as a reason
for discarding group-based equal protection. He also disagrees with the
idea that egalitarianism and social capital are incompatible. Thus, while
some legal scholars and the Court have argued that race-conscious policies of inclusion cause social discord and divisions, Putnam argues that
these practices have the opposite effect in the long-term and that they are
necessary for an increasingly and inevitably pluralistic society.
2. Putnam Has Retreated Somewhat from His Earlier Positions
Regarding the Decline in Social Capital
In addition to criticizing the use of his research to oppose affirmative
action, Putnam has moderated some of his assertions regarding the decline in civic participation since the 1950s. For this additional reason,
scholars should exercise caution before using Putnam’s work to justify
the Court’s balkanization rhetoric.
On March 2, 2008, Putnam published an essay in The Boston Globe
that examines the “rebirth of American civic life.”127 Putnam argues that
the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries and caucuses “have evinced
the sharpest increase in civic engagement among American youth in at
least a half-century, portending a remarkable revitalization of American
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PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 358–59 (emphasis in orig-

inal).
125

Id. at 359 (conceding difficulty establishing causality between social
capital and equality); id. at 358–59 (rejecting idea that social capital and egalitarianism are mutually exclusive).
126
Putnam Brief, supra note 119, at 3–4.
127
Robert Putnam, The Rebirth of American Civil Life, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/
oped/articles/2008/03/02/the_rebirth_of_american_civic_life/?page=full.
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democracy.”128 To support his contention, Putnam cites polling data of
UCLA undergraduates that show an upswing in voting rates after years
of continuous declines.129 Putnam attributes this rise in civic participation to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. He argues that the tragedy had a unifying effect upon all Americans, reminding them that “we
are all in this together.”130 Putnam contends that the 2008 Democratic
presidential primaries and caucuses mark the “coming-out” of a new politically engaged generation.131
Putnam made similar arguments regarding an increase in civic participation among younger voters in another 2008 article, Still Bowling
Alone? The Post-9/11 Split.132 Putnam believes that other societal factors, such as the unifying effects of the September 11 terrorist attacks,
social media, and Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign, have led
to a revitalization of civic engagement.133 Thus, even if Putnam’s observations that link ethnic and racial pluralism with social anxiety and division were correct, his later works suggest that these purported divisions
have rapidly declined. Accordingly, his research and the writings of likeminded social capital theorists provide questionable support for the Supreme Court’s balkanization rhetoric, its failure to validate the equal protection claims of vulnerable classes, and its hostile stance toward legislative remedies for discrimination and subordination.
B. Social Capital Scholarship Has Received an Abundance
of Academic Criticism
Social capital literature, particularly Putnam’s work, has generated
an abundance of academic criticism. In fact, political scientist Carl
Boggs made the observation regarding Bowling Alone that Putnam’s
“iconic status does not prevent his book from being so conceptually
flawed and historically misleading that it would seem to require yet another large tome just to give adequate space to the needed systemic critique.”134
Many authors agree with Boggs’s observation; social scientists have
published several books and numerous articles that contest various as128

Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Robert D. Putnam & Thomas H. Sander, Still Bowling Alone? The Post
9/11 Split, 21 J. DEMOCRACY 9 (2010) [hereinafter Putnam & Sander, Still
Bowling Alone], available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/ocpa/pdf/still%20bow
ling%20alone.pdf.
133
Id. at 10–13.
134
Carl Boggs, Social Capital and Political Fantasy: Robert Putnam’s
“Bowling Alone,” 30 THEORY & SOC’Y 281, 282 (2001), available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/657878.pdf?acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=tr
ue.
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pects of Putnam’s work.135 These critiques question the methodology of
social capital literature and the fundamental observations this scholarship
makes regarding the divisiveness of racial and ethnic diversity. Many of
the studies contest the finding that a strong negative relationship between
racial and ethnic diversity and social cohesion even exists. To the extent
that such a relationship exists, some critics argue that it is “weak and
contingent on various individual and contextual factors.”136
This section reviews some of the leading academic critiques of the
argument that racial and ethnic diversity have diminished the level of
civic participation in the United States and has led to a society of isolated individuals. This section does not provide an independent empirical
assessment of Putnam’s work. Instead, it relies upon reputable, persuasive, and voluminous empirical studies that question Putnam’s findings.
Given the numerous problems that social scientists have observed regarding Putnam’s work, legal scholars should rethink using this research
as a basis for explaining or justifying the Court’s balkanization rhetoric
and the abandonment of group-based equal protection.
1. Causation Versus Correlation
Many critics contend that Putnam’s research does not permit a firm
conclusion regarding causation and that he has only shown (if at all) correlation of social capital and a community’s well-being. Princeton sociologists Alejandro Portes and Erik Vickstrom, for example, considered
five variables that Putnam describes as “consequences of social capital:
child welfare, single parenthood, economic inequality, poverty, and general population health.”137 Because Putnam measures social capital levels
135

See Steven N. Durlauf, Bowling Alone: A Review Essay, 47 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 259, 260 (2000) available at https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/
archive/wp2029.pdf (“Bowling Alone is in many ways very disappointing, particularly when judged from the perspective of rigor or analytical depth. The
many interesting facts that are documented are not subjected to a careful analysis of their causes or their consequences. Hence in my judgment, as a piece of
scholarly social science, the book is largely a failure.”); Dietlind Stolle & Marc
Hooghe, Review Article: Inaccurate, Exceptional, One-Sided or Irrelevant? The
Debate about the Alleged Decline of Social Capital and Civic Engagement in
Western Societies, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 149, 150 (2004), available at http://prof
s-polisci.mcgill.ca/stolle/Publications_files/FinalBJPS.pdf (“The Bowling Alone
thesis has been variously characterized as plainly wrong, pessimistic or traditional. A number of authors have claimed that Putnam idolizes the vanished
hierarchical world of the 1950s, in which most women were home-makers and
therefore had more time on their hands to engage in various civic duties. Others
depict the decline thesis as pure nostalgia, a manifestation of the longing for a
civic and engaged era that has clearly ended.”).
136
Alejandro Portes & Eric Vickstrom, Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 461, 463 (2011), available at http://www.annual
reviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-150022.
137
Id. at 464.
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simultaneously with these five variables, determining causation becomes
impossible.138
For example, Portes and Vickstrom question Putnam’s findings that
social capital reduces juvenile delinquency and arrests. While it is plausible that social capital leads to lower criminality and arrests among juveniles, it is also reasonable to assume that lower rates of criminality
foster community trust and civic participation.139 Portes and Vickstrom
make similar arguments regarding the other four factors they studied.
Because Putnam does not use a “time sensitive measure” of the rates of
social capital and the dependent variables he claims are causally related
to social capital, his research can only prove correlation and not causation.140 Other scholars have made similar observations regarding social
capital and its purported societal benefits.141
2. Outmoded Measures of Civic Participation
Scholars have also criticized Putnam’s use of dated and outmoded
measures of civic participation. For example, Putnam finds that declining membership in organizations such as the League of Women Voters,
Elks Lodge, Moose Lounge, Knights of Columbus, Rotary Club,
NAACP, and Parent-Teacher Association demonstrates a fall in social
capital and civic participation.142 Putnam also asserts that religious participation, workplace connections, and informal social interactions foster
greater social trust and higher levels of civic participation.143
Critics, however, argue that many of Putnam’s measures of civic participation are relics of a bygone era and that they are not essential for
social cohesion. Portes and Vickstrom, for example, assert that “[m]utual
trust and bowling leagues are nice things to have, but they do not represent a sine qua nom for a viable society.”144 Instead, “organic solidari138

Id. at 464–65.
Id. at 464.
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Id. at 464–65.
141
See, e.g., Steven Durlauf, supra note 135, at 262–64 (discussing causality flaws in Bowling Alone); Peter Nannestad, What Have We Learned About
Generalized Trust, If Anything?, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 413, 429 (2008), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.06060
6.135412 (“Is growth the effect or one of the causes of generalized trust, or is
there a two-way causation between generalized trust and growth/prosperity?”);
Joel Sobel, Can We Trust Social Capital?, J. ECON. LIT. 139, 140 (2002), available at http://are.berkeley.edu/~cmantinori/prclass/Sobel.pdf (“[Bowling Alone]
often confuses cause and effect. The argument of the book appears to be that
measurable declines in group activities cause bad outcomes. With this interpretation, reductions in monetary donations to charity may be seen as a consequence of a decline in social capital . . . but not as direct proof that the stock of
social capital has decreased.”).
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ty”—or agreement on a “set of norms that are understood and accepted
by all and are enforced by specialized agencies”—can cohere diverse
societies.145 “Mutual acquaintance” is not the exclusive route to social
cohesion.146
In addition, the list of organizations that Putnam utilizes as indicators of civic engagement seems less relevant in a highly urbanized society with rapidly changing notions of gender and race and with increasing
class disparity.147 Church attendance has fallen as public policy has relied more upon science and debate, rather than religious tenets.148 Many
of the clubs that Putnam discusses, e.g., Rotary and Elks, are conformist
and very traditional. Also, some forms of volunteerism declined because
the organizations accomplished their short-term goals.149 Rather than
indicating a decrease in social capital, declining membership in voluntary organizations could result from the changing needs of a larger segment of the population.
Putnam also discounts new forms of civic participation. Even if
membership in large organizations such as the Rotary Club has fallen,
Putnam does not consider alternative forms of participation that are less
formal and that emerge to deal with specific issues.150 Furthermore, as
several of his critics have observed, Putnam gives very little attention to
the creation of new outlets for highly political and communitarian activities such as the Internet, social media, and social movements.151 In Bowling Alone, Putnam devotes only 33 out of 539 pages to examining these
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Capital’: Civic Values versus Economic Equality in the EU, 19 EURO. SOC.
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159 (2005) (discussing “ad hoc” volunteerism, such as “AIDS Walk, beach
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Fisher, supra note 150, at 159.
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alternative forms of volunteerism, political action, and communitarianism.152
3. Ignoring Racial and Class Inequality
Many scholars have criticized Putnam and other social capital theorists for their failure to account for racial and class inequality and segregation (among other factors) in their work. Some of these scholars find
that racial and class disparities have a greater negative impact on social
capital than racial and ethnic diversity. Others have argued that racial
isolation and segregation matter more than racial and ethnic diversity.
Some researchers have found that after controlling for racial and class
inequality, racial diversity has a small or insignificant impact upon social
capital. These findings, if accurate, seriously undermine the use of Putnam’s work (and similar scholarship) to justify the Court’s balkanization
rhetoric and abandonment of class-based equal protection.
To test Putnam’s conclusions, political scientist Eric Uslaner has
conducted several empirical studies regarding social cohesion. Uslaner
concludes that “[r]esidential segregation, not diversity, leads to lower
levels of trust” and that “[s]egregation has been linked to a wide range of
negative outcomes.”153 In his research, Uslaner studies the level of geographical racial isolation in several countries, including the United
States. The countries in which minority racial groups experience the
highest levels of isolation also have the “lowest levels of generalized
trust,” which social capital theorists treat as a precondition for civic participation.154
Putnam, by contrast, contends that diversity diminishes trust.155 Diversity and racial isolation, however, are not mutually exclusive concepts.156 With respect to the United States, Uslaner finds that diversity
diminishes trust primarily for whites, but not for African Americans
(perhaps because trust levels among African Americans are typically
low).157 On the other hand, integration and diversity increase trust sub-
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See P UTNAM, B OWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 148–89 (discussing
possible bright spots in social capital, despite the overall decline).
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Eric M. Uslaner, Segregation, Mistrust and Minorities, 10 ETHNICITIES
415, 416 (2010).
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See generally Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39.
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See Uslaner, supra note 153, at 424 (“Segregation and diversity are not
the same thing.”) (emphasis in original); id. (“High levels of diversity are compatible with perfect segregation, perfect integration, or anything in between.”).
157
Id. at 426; see also RODNEY HERO, R ACIAL D IVERSITY AND SOCIAL
C APITAL: EQUALITY AND C OMMUNITY IN AMERICA (2007) (criticizing social
capital theorists for not taking race into account and finding that racial diversity
damages social capital among whites much more than among persons of color).
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stantially for both African Americans and whites, especially when these
conditions lead to diverse friendship networks.158
In another publication, Bo Rothstein and Uslaner analyze the impact
of economic inequality and inequality of opportunity upon social trust.159
Rothstein and Uslaner find that social trust levels are the highest in countries with greater economic equality.160 They also find a “powerful” negative relationship between trust and economic inequality in the United
States using data from 1960 to 2002.161 Rothstein and Uslaner’s research
also finds that as economic inequality widens, trust levels decline.162 The
authors do not claim that inequality alone influences the level of social
trust in a country, but they do find that the relationship between the two
variables is pervasive and strong.163
Numerous scholars have reached similar conclusions regarding the
correlation between inequality and diminished social trust. Jong-sung
You, for example, examines data from eighty countries, including the
United States.164 Putnam’s research and similar scholarship would predict that greater racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity negatively correlate with social trust. You, however, finds that only ethnic diversity correlates with a decline in social trust.165 After controlling for
political corruption and income inequality, however, ethnic diversity has
no significant effect upon social trust.166
158

Uslaner, supra note 153, at 424 (27% for whites, 30% for African Americans); see also id. (“Living in a city that is both diverse and integrated does not
by itself increase trust. However, someone living in a city that is both diverse
and integrated will be 27 percent more likely to trust others if (s)he has a diverse
friendship network . . . .”).
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Bo Rothstein & Eric Uslaner, All for One: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust, 58 W ORLD P OL. 41 (2005). (The authors also examine how political
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Id. at 47–48.
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Id. at 48.
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33 P OL. P SYCHOL. 701, 714 (2012).
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Id. See also Edward Fieldhouse & David Cutts, Does Diversity Damage
Social Capital? A Comparative Study of Neighbourhood Diversity and Social
Capital in the US and Britain, 43 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 289, 307–08 (2010) (discussing the “crucial” impact of poverty on social capital in the US and concluding that the effect of poverty “outweigh[s] that of diversity by some distance”);
id. (arguing that the impact of poverty on social capital is less in Britain than in
the United States and hypothesizing that lower levels of minority concentrated
poverty probably explains this result); Marc Hooghe, Tim Reeskens, Dietlind
Stolle, & Ann Trappers, Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A
Cross-National Multilevel Study, COMP. POL. SCI. 198, 211 (2009) (“Income
inequality affects the level of the trust as expected: People are more trustful in
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This research challenges the connections that some social capital
theorists have made between racial diversity and declining social capital.
Social scientists have found that racial segregation and racial and economic class inequality have a greater negative effect upon (or negative
correlation with) social capital than diversity alone. Although Putnam
acknowledges the possibility that class stratification causes rather than
results from diminished social capital, he fails to give economic inequality systematic treatment in Bowling Alone or E Pluribus Unum.167 In

countries with low levels of income disparity.”); James Laurence, The Effect of
Ethnic Diversity and Community Disadvantage on Social Cohesion: A MultiLevel Analysis of Social Capital and Interethnic Relations in UK Communities,
27 EURO. SOCIO. REV. 70, 85 (2011) (“Disadvantage . . . not only has a much
stronger eroding effect on social capital than diversity, but is also associated
with increasing intolerance. In fact, it is only when we control out disadvantage’s negative effect that diversity significantly improves tolerance. Any
truly concerted effort to tackle problems of community tensions must take this
into account and not relegate the role of disadvantage at the expense of simply
attempting to encourage greater community interaction.”); Natalia Letki, Does
Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighbourhoods, 56 POL. STUD. 99, 120 (2008) (finding a correlation between racial
diversity and lower neighborhood trust, but nonetheless concluding that “when
the association between racial diversity and economic deprivation is accounted
for, there is no evidence for the eroding effect of racial diversity on interactions
within local communities” and that “interactions improve perceptions of a
neighbourhood, regardless of its economic status or racial composition, but
these interactions are far less frequent in poorer neighbourhoods”); O’Connell,
supra note 147 at 241–48 (arguing that economic equality is a much stronger
predictor of social cohesion than social capital); Dan Rodríguez-García, Beyond
Assimilation and Multiculturalism: A Critical Review of the Debate on Managing Diversity, J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 251, 268 (2010) (“[W]hen
support for diversity occurs within a framework of social and political equality,
and interaction across cultural difference becomes developed as a societal value
. . . the heterogeneous and dialogic civic space the occurs is more likely to have
the effect of leading to overall greater social cohesiveness, rather than to outcomes of segregation and exclusion.”); see generally Portes & Vickstrom, supra
note 136, at 470 (reviewing literature linking racial segregation and economic
inequality to a decline in social capital). At least one author, however, discounts
any link economic inequality and social capital; instead, he argues that Putnam
fails to consider the particular forms of social interaction that take place in poor
communities of color. See James DeFillippis, The Myth of Social Capital in
Community Development, 12 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 781, 796–97 (2010) (discussing “trust-based relations” in “inner cities”).
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See PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 359 (conceding that
“great disparities of wealth and power are inimical to widespread participation
and broadly shared integration” but declining to “adjudicate this complicated
historical question”); Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39, at 157 (observing that “people who live in neighbourhoods of greater economic inequality also
tend to withdraw from social and civic life”).
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a more recent work, however, Putnam seems more convinced of the relevance of economic inequality to social capital. He warns that:
[T]he overall rise in youth political engagement and
volunteering since 9/11 masks a pair of subtrends that
are headed in different directions, with lower-class
youth growing less involved while better-off youngsters
become more involved. Since public discussion in the
United States often tends to conflate class and race, it is
important to emphasize that this growing gap among different groups of young people is about the former and
not just the latter.
If the United States is to avoid becoming two nations, it must find ways to expand the post-9/11 resurgence of civic and social engagement beyond the ranks
of affluent young white people. The widening gaps that
we are seeing in social capital, academic ambition, and
self-esteem augur poorly for the life chances of working-class youngsters. If these gaps remain unaddressed,
the United States could become less a land of opportunity than a caste society replete with the tightly limited social mobility and simmering resentments that such societies invariably feature.168
Putnam believes that social policy should address class inequality,
but he fails to provide any specific vision regarding such remedies.
Nonetheless, Putnam’s recognition of the relationship between economic
inequality and declining social capital seriously calls into question the
use of his research to validate the Supreme Court’s departure from
group-based equal protection. If the Supreme Court truly believes that its
doctrines should promote social cohesion, then it should vigorously utilize the Equal Protection Clause to help eradicate group-based inequities;
these inequities cause more social division than diversity alone. The
Court, however, has taken the exact opposite approach and interprets the
Equal Protection Clause in a manner that sustains social disadvantages
and privileges.169
4. Negative Implications of Social Capital
Social capital theorists have also received criticism because they
treat the accumulation of social capital as inherently positive. This view,
however, obscures the oppression and discrimination that civic participation and other forms of social capital can facilitate. Some social capital
theorists distinguish “bonding” from “bridging” social capital. Bonding
social capital describes civic engagement among small homogenous
168
169

Putnam & Sander, Still Bowling Alone, supra note 132 at 14.
See infra text accompanying notes 227–67.
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groups, while bridging social capital refers to cohesion across a spectrum
of different communities.170 Putnam argues that racial and ethnic diversity diminishes both types of group bonding.171 Putnam and other theorists, however, tend to dismiss the harmful societal consequences of social capital—particularly the historical injustices facilitated by political
participation within homogenous communities.
Political scientist Barbara Arneil discusses the negative impact of
bonding social capital in Diverse Communities, a comprehensive and
methodical critique of Bowling Alone.172 As Arneil argues, Putnam describes the Progressive Era in glowing terms.173 Undoubtedly, earlytwentieth-century reformers pursued many laudable goals, including union organizing, social welfare, and expanded public education. These
mass movements spurred by dynamic civic engagement also participated
in and promoted some of the most oppressive practices and ideas in
United States history, including eugenics, social Darwinism, xenophobia,
forced assimilation, patriarchy, racism, forced sterilization, and sexual
repression.174
170

PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 22–23.
See Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 39, at 143–44.
172
See generally BARBARA ARNEIL, DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: THE PROBLEM
WITH SOCIAL CAPITAL (2006).
173
Id. at 15 (“In the penultimate chapter of Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam
makes the case that the Progressive Era, a society he considers to be replete with
social capital, provides a largely positive model of social connectedness.”).
Arneil provides a good description of the “Progressive Era”: “The Progressive
era dated from the end of the nineteenth century to around 1920 and was
marked by a movement for social reform, particularly in urban centres, whereby
community provision was made for the less well-off and immigrants . . . as well
as by the larger political reforms of the Suffragette movement.” Id. at 15 n.1.
174
See id. at 15–40 (discussing negative aspects of Progressive Movement);
Irene Bloemraad, Compte Rendu: Diverse Communities, 33 CAN. J. SOCIO. 439,
440 (2008) (review essay) (“The high point of social capital, which Putnam
places in the Progressive Era, had a dark and oppressive side for women, ethnic
and racial minorities, and those with disabilities. Civic unity, based on shared
norms and a Christian vision of progress, meant forced assimilation for many
immigrants and native Americans, exclusion of African Americans, forced sterilization of the disabled, and the assumption that women would work for the
social capital of others and their community, but not their own empowerment.”);
Pedro Cabán, Subjects and Immigrants During the Progressive Era, 23
DISCOURSE 26–31 (2001) (discussing racist and xenophobic roots of United
States “Americanization” policies and how public schools became instruments
of these policies); Catherine Cocks, Rethinking Sexuality in the Progressive Era,
5 J. GILDED AGE & THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 93 (2006) (discussing racist, sexist,
and eugenics driven policing of sexuality during the Progressive Era); Gregory
Michael Dorr, Defective or Disabled?: Race, Medicine, and Eugenics in Progressive Era Virginia and Alabama, 5 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 359
(2006) (discussing multiple dimensions of sexism, classism, racism, and eugenics that informed forced sterilization legislation); Eric L. Goldstein, The Unsta171
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The use of social capital among close-knit and homogenous groups
also helped to sustain racial violence and exclusion. Legal scholar
Stephanie M. Stern addresses this subject in The Dark Side of Town.175
Responding to the enthusiastic reception of social capital theories among
property scholars, Stern argues that “sundown towns”—racially exclusionary early-twentieth-century locales policed by actual and threatened
racial violence—existed because whites successfully utilized in-group
bonding to maintain white supremacy:
In sundown towns, collective action was embedded
in dense networks of social ties that spread information
about riots, pledges, mob violence, and other coordinated action and channeled anti-black norms. Community
cohesion helped to reward participants with social standing and group identity—benefits in addition to any implicit compensation they derived from racist acts.
Groups of residents or business owners gathered to sign
pledges not to employ blacks or to allow them to live in
the area. Residents converged on blacks to warn them to
leave town.176
Although Stern’s work focuses exclusively on antiblack practices, Chinese Americans, Mexican Americans, and Native Americans experienced
similar forms of racist mob violence, geographic exclusion, and dispossession.177

ble Other: Locating the Jew in Progressive-Era American Racial Discourse, 89
AM. JEWISH HIST. 383 (2001) (discussing negative portrayals of Jewish Americans during Progressive Era); Mara L. Keire, The Vice Trust: A Reinterpretation
of the White Slavery Scare in the United States, 1907–1917, J. SOC. HIST. 5
(2001) (discussing use of intersecting corrupt businesses and white female sexual purity tropes by Progressive Era anti-vice movement); Thomas C. Leonard,
Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 207 (2007) (discussing the eugenics basis for labor and immigration reform during the Progressive Era); Sally M. Miller, For White Men Only: The
Socialist Party of America and Issues of Gender, Ethnicity and Race, 2 J.
GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA 283 (2003) (discussing racism, sexism, and
Anglo-Saxon-centrism of the Socialist Party of America); Sarah Potter, “Undesirable Relations”: Same-Sex Relationships and the Meaning of Sexual Desire
at a Women’s Reformatory during the Progressive Era, 30 FEMINIST STUDS. 394
(2004) (examining the racial, class, sex, and heterosexist dimensions of Progressive Era sexual moralists).
175
Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property, 99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013).
176
Id. at 843. See also Durlauf, supra note 135, at 270 (arguing that “social
capital, as understood by Putnam, was an important component in perpetuating
racial isolation” in southern states).
177
D. MICHAEL BOTTOMS, AN ARISTOCRACY OF COLOR: RACE AND
RECONSTRUCTION IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850–1890, at 169–201
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Historically, social capital enforced many of most pernicious aspects
of racial subordination, including racial violence, economic deprivation,
and segregation. Putnam, however, does not completely ignore these issues in his work. Indeed, he devotes a short chapter in Bowling Alone to
discussing the risk that social capital can lead to harmful outcomes.178
Moreover, recognizing the terrible injustices of the Progressive Era does
not require that scholars dismiss the entire time period or fail to consider
whether it offers important lessons for political organizing.179 Nonetheless, the atrocities of this time period counsel against uncritical celebration and promotion of social capital.180
Due to the numerous problems that empirical scholars have found
with Putnam’s work and with similar scholarship, social capital theory
does not serve as a firm basis for defending the Supreme Court’s retreat
from group-based equal protection, nor does it justify turning to dignitybased claims as a suitable replacement. Furthermore, as Part III demonstrates, social psychologists—who specialize in analyzing group-based
behavior—offer research that provides a more helpful social context for
understanding developments in the Court’s racial discrimination doctrine. This research also offers empirical justifications for preserving
group-based identities and equal protection.

(2013) (discussing violent removal of Chinese from areas of the West Coast
during the nineteenth century); WILLIAM D. CARRIGAN & CLIVE WEBB,
FORGOTTEN DEAD: MOB VIOLENCE AGAINST MEXICANS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1848–1928, at 17–63 (2013) (discussing lynching of Mexicans in Southwest,
due to racism, economic competition, and territorial clashes); Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian
Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court
Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 111 (1994) (discussing ejectment of Cherokee from
Georgia).
178
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 98, at 350–63.
179
See Robert D. Johnston, Re-Democratizing the Progressive Era: The
Politics of Progressive Era Political Historiography, 1 J. GILDED AGE &
PROGRESSIVE ERA 68 (2002) (acknowledging the numerous injustices of the
Progressive Era but arguing that the time period contains many positive lessons
regarding political organizing). Problems regarding racial and class hierarchies
existed within Progressive Era-movements for racial justice as well. See Susan
D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910–1920), 20
L. & HIST. REV. 97 (2002) (discussing how the control of the NAACP by white
attorneys created conflict between the organization’s goals and the opinions of
most blacks).
180
Many contemporary organizations also complicate the blanket assertion
that social capital helps society. See Boggs, supra note 134, at 286 (discussing
the “flourishing of small, local groups overflowing” with social capital such as
“urban gangs, cults, paramilitary militias, and assorted patriarchal movements
like Promise Keepers, Brotherhood of Aryan Nations, and the Muslim Brotherhood”).
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III. PREVENTING BALKANIZATION OR FACILITATING
RACIAL DOMINATION?
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as:
(1) strongly prohibiting race-based legal remedies except in the narrowest circumstances; (2) generally permitting state action that negatively
impacts historically disadvantaged classes; and (3) only barring discrimination against a few vulnerable classes, while leaving other groups to
rely upon the political process for redress. The Court justifies these doctrinal choices on the grounds that to hold otherwise would lead to balkanization. According to the Court, recognition of group rights or remedies divides society. The budding dignity-based liberty doctrine, by
contrast, arguably minimizes group conflict or pluralism anxiety because
it identifies universal interests and does not require group identity as a
basis for remediation.181
As an abstract principle, this analysis of Court doctrine seems unremarkable. Empirically, however, the balkanization rhetoric raises tremendous concerns regarding the Court’s understanding of contemporary
race relations, the institutional role of the Court, and the purpose of equal
protection. As this Part demonstrates, the Court’s discarding of the suspect class doctrine and the requirements of colorblindness and discriminatory intent does not avoid social conflict. Instead, the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause implements core beliefs that most
whites hold regarding the status of race in the United States. Relative to
persons of color, whites prefer colorblindness and oppose multiculturalism. Whites also tend to support individualism rather than group-based
identity and rights. In addition, whites are more likely to believe that
racism no longer represents a significant obstacle to equal opportunity.
Finally, whites see themselves as a racially vulnerable class, perhaps
even more susceptible of discrimination than persons of color. Most
people of color strenuously disagree with these viewpoints. Accordingly,
whether by design or effect, the Court’s equal protection doctrine implements many of the core racial viewpoints held by whites and leads to
the reinforcement of racial inequality. This is a peculiar form of equal
protection.
A. Social Psychology Theories of Group Behavior
The traditional social capital literature, such as Putnam’s research,
offers a very limited understanding of group behavior. Other social science scholarship, however, provides greater insight regarding the motivation of individuals and groups. Specifically, works of social psychologists, who have analyzed the dynamics of group behavior for more than
a century, provide more reliable and accurate material for understanding

181

See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5.
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how the Court’s equal protection doctrine relates to society.182 Prevailing
themes in social psychology literature support the argument that the
Court’s justification for abandoning group-based equal protection mirrors the views that most whites have regarding race relations. These
dominant-group views concerning race differ sharply from those of persons of color. Accordingly, social psychology literature helps demonstrate that the Court’s equal protection doctrine is white-centric.
1. Individualism Is a Social Construct
Contrary to Court doctrine, social psychology literature does not
view people as atomistic agents. Instead, the individual and society are
mutually constitutive. Individuals define themselves within specific societal contexts; these individual personalities, in turn, help to shape the
dynamics of larger group culture.183 Empirical research finds that this
theory holds true even in societies like Western Europe and the United
States with very strong cultures that emphasize individualism.184 While
many legal doctrines treat the individual as the main object of civil rights
law and a well-functioning society, social psychologists view the individual and society as inseparable:
[D]espite the ideology of individualism and the manifold political and legal practices that privilege the individual, people are not just autonomous individuals solely under their own production and orchestration. They
are also centers of dynamic interpersonal relationships,
and these relationships are significant in determining
who they are, who they try to be, and how they behave.
. . . [I]ncreasingly it is evident that identity is indeed a
group project.185
2. Social Dominance Theory
Social psychologists have also compiled substantial research regarding group-based inequality. In their influential book Social Dominance,
psychologists Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto find that “all human socie-

182

See generally Dorwin Cartwright, 42 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 82 (1979) (observing in 1979 that the formal school of social psychology has existed for “approximately eighty years”).
183
Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Cultures and Selves: A Cycle
of Mutual Constitution, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 420, 421 (2010).
184
Hazel Rose Markus, Claude M. Steele & Dorothy M. Steele, Colorblindness as a Barrier to Inclusion: Assimilation and Nonimmigrant Minorities,
129 DAEDALUS 233, 248 (2000).
185
Id. Despite the prevalence of individualism discourse in equal protection
case law, the Court has, in fact, recognized the important connections between
the individual and society in several cases and doctrines. See infra text accompanying notes 305–12.
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ties tend to be structured as group-based social hierarchies.”186 Diverging
endowments of social value distinguish dominant and subordinate
groups.187 Dominant groups possess a “disproportionately large share of
positive social value” defined as “material and symbolic things for which
people strive.”188 Subordinate groups, by contrast, “possess a disproportionately large share of negative social value.”189 Items of positive social
value include “political authority and power, good and plentiful food,
splendid homes, the best available health care, wealth, and high social
status.”190 Negative social value includes things such as “low power and
social status, high-risk and low-status occupations, relatively poor health
care, poor food, modest or miserable homes, and severe negative sanctions (e.g., prison and death sentences).”191 Sidanius and Pratto use the
term “social dominance theory” to describe their conclusions regarding
social organization.192
Sidanius and Pratto make two additional observations that shall inform this Article’s ensuing discussion of Court doctrine. First, groupbased hierarchies are almost impervious to change.193 Even when egalitarian measures help to alleviate the conditions of subordinate groups,
the relative inequality between subordinate and dominant classes remains the same.194 Second, group-based societies construct “legitimizing
myths”—or “attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that
provide moral and intellectual justification” for group-based inequality.195

186

JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP
THEORY OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 31 (1999).
187
Id. at 31–32.
188
Id. at 31.
189
Id. at 32.
190
Id. at 31–32.
191
Id. at 32. Sidanius and Pratto also distinguish group-based from individual-based social hierarchies. In a group-based hierarchy, individuals in dominant
groups derive benefits from their membership in the dominant group; in individual-based hierarchy, benefits are earned by individual efforts. This distinction
does not mean that dominant group members do not work to obtain positive
value. Instead, the distinction emphasizes that individual differences cannot
explain the disparity in positive social value held by dominant versus subordinate group members. Id. at 32.
192
Id. at 31.
193
Id. at 33–39.
194
Id. at 37 (observing that the social status of blacks increased dramatically in public opinion polls between 1964 and 1989, but that the relative difference between white and black status remained virtually unchanged).
195
Id. at 45. The concept of a legitimizing myth is similar to terms used by
other social theorists to explain hierarchy-sustaining ideology.

2015]

A Critique of the New Equal Protection

43

B. Social Psychology Theory and Race Relations
Researchers have conducted numerous empirical studies that test the
claims made by Sidanius and Pratto. This research provides great insight
into the dynamics of United States race relations and the impact of race
upon Supreme Court doctrine, including equal protection case law. In
particular, these studies reveal great disparities among the views of
whites and persons of color regarding the desirability and appropriateness of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism versus colorblindness and
assimilation; support for individualistic or group-based social models;
contemporary relevance of race and racism to opportunities for social
and economic advancement; and substantiality of racial discrimination
against whites.
1. Multiculturalism Versus Colorblindness
Numerous studies have considered whether race impacts individual
support for multiculturalism or colorblindness. The results of these studies are remarkably consistent and clear: generally, whites oppose multiculturalism and prefer colorblindness, while persons of color tend to
support multiculturalism much more than colorblindness.196 The research
196

See e.g., Evan P. Apfelbaum Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I. Norton,
Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness in Social
Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918 (2008) (“Colorblindness
has emerged as a norm endorsed by many Whites and evident across a wide
range of domains . . . .”); Alison M. Konrad & Frank Linehan, Race and Sex
Differences in Line Managers’ Reactions to Equal Employment Opportunity and
Affirmative Action Interventions, 20 GRP. & ORG. MGMT. 409, 424 (1995) (finding that persons of color and white women were more supportive of “identityconscious” hiring practices than white men and that persons of color were more
supportive of such policies than white women); Markus et al., supra note 184, at
246 (discussing whites’ preference for assimilation and colorblindness versus
pluralistic perspective held by persons of color); Victoria C. Plaut Flannery G.
Garnett, Laura E. Buffardi, & Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, “What About Me?”: Perceptions of Exclusion and Whites’ Reaction to Multiculturalism, 101 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 337, 339 (2011) (“Although there are certainly
individual exceptions and wide variation, empirically, dominant racial/ethnic
group members such as Whites appear to show less support for multiculturalism
than do minorities.”); Aneeta Rattan & Nalini Ambady, Diversity Ideologies and
Intergroup Relations: An Examination of Colorblindness and Multiculturalism,
EURO. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 12, 13–14 (2013) (“The extant research shows that
majority group members tend to endorse a colorblind ideology to a greater degree than minority group members. . . .”); id. at 14 (“Minority group members
are less likely to endorse colorblindness than are majority group members. Instead, they tend to endorse multiculturalism.”); Carey S. Ryan, Jennifer S. Hunt,
Joshua A. Weibel, Charles R. Peterson, Juan F. Casas, Multicultural and Colorblind Ideology, Stereotypes, and Ethnocentrism among Black and White Americans, 10 GRP. PROCESSES INTERGROUP REL. 617, 623–24 (2007) (reporting results of a study finding that “the tendency to endorse multiculturalism more than
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makes this finding with such a high degree of certainty that it has become a standard working assumption among social psychologists.197
Researchers have isolated several factors that explain the differing
views among whites and persons of color regarding colorblindness and
multiculturalism. First, some researchers have found that whites believe
multiculturalism does not include them.198 Others have observed that
whites, particularly those who strongly support social dominance, oppose multiculturalism because they believe it threatens whites’ higher
social status.199 Some studies connect whites’ opposition to multiculturcolorblindness was greater among Black than White participants” and that
“White participants more strongly endorsed a colorblind ideology than did
Blacks” and that “Black participants more strongly endorsed a multicultural
than a colorblind ideology”); Maykel Verkuyten, Ethnic Group Identification
and Group Evaluation Among Minority and Majority Groups: Testing the Multiculturalism Hypothesis, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 121, 134 (2005)
(discussing results of a study in the Netherlands that finds greater support for
multiculturalism among Turkish minority participants and more support for assimilation among Dutch majority participants); Maykel Verkuyten, Social Psychology and Multiculturalism, 1 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 280,
283 (2007) [hereinafter Verkuyten, Social Psychology and Multiculturalism]
(“Empirical studies on multicultural attitudes indicate that the general support
for multiculturalism is not very strong among majority groups in many Western
countries.”); Christopher Wolsko, Bernadette Park & Charles M. Judd, Considering the Tower of Babel: Correlates of Assimilation and Multiculturalism
among Ethnic Minority and Majority Groups in the United States, 19 SOC. JUST.
RES. 277, 301 (2006) (reporting “clear patterns of divergence between the attitudes of whites and ethnic minorities,” including greater support for multiculturalism and lesser support for assimilation among minority groups, relative to
whites). One study makes a more tentative claim than others. See Jack Citrin,
David O. Sears, Christopher Muste & Cara Wong, Multiculturalism in American
Public Opinion, 31 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 247, 266 (2001) (“The tendency of minority groups to be more favourable towards multiculturalism than whites is present,
but surprisingly modest.”).
197
See sources cited supra note 196 (citing abundant scholarly support for
the contention that whites favor colorblindness and assimilation more than persons of color and that persons of color prefer race-consciousness and multiculturalism more than whites).
198
Plaut et al., supra note 196, at 349 (finding that whites feel excluded
from multiculturalism but not colorblindness); Rattan & Ambady, supra note
196, at 14 (discussing whites’ feelings of exclusion from multiculturalism).
199
Lawrence Bobo, Race, Interests, and Beliefs About Affirmative Action,
41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 985, 997 (1998) (finding that “group-based interests”
explain, in part, white opposition to affirmative action); Christopher M. Federico & Jim Sidanius, Racism, Ideology, and Affirmative Action Revisited: The
Antecedents and Consequences of “Principled Objections” to Affirmative Action, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 488, 499 (2002) (finding that support
for group dominance among whites explains white opposition to affirmative
action directly and indirectly—by influencing whether whites accept purportedly principled policy arguments used to oppose affirmative action); Brian S.
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alism and support for colorblindness to their ideological and political
views regarding policies such as affirmative action. 200 These studies, in
turn, find that a number of variables correlate with or cause white opposition to affirmative action, including racism, principled policy arguments, and the framing of the policy in public discourse (e.g., as a quota
or preference versus training and outreach).201
2. Groups Versus Individuals
Whites also tend to have a social orientation that denies group differences and stresses individualism, while persons of color support policies that emphasize group differences and experiences.202 This conclusion relates to race-based differences regarding the attractiveness of
multiculturalism or colorblindness. Colorblindness, which whites prefer
more than persons of color, treats “group differences” as “largely superficial” or “not substantial enough to warrant a claim on public policy or
social organization.”203 People of color, by contrast, are more likely to
support multiculturalism, which “holds that ethnic and racial variety is
pleasing and important, both to the various groups themselves and to
society as a whole—so important, in fact, that it can and should be celebrated.”204
3. Contemporary Relevance of Racism
Statistical studies consistently find vast disparities among the social
and economic well-being of whites and persons of color.205 Despite the
pervasiveness of substantive racial inequality, whites tend to believe that
Lowery, Mighuel M. Unzueta, Eric D. Knowles & Phillip Atiba Goff, Concern
for the In-Group and Opposition to Affirmative Action, 90 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 970 (finding that white opposition to affirmative action
increases if they believe it threatens their group status); C. Lausanne Renfro,
Walter G. Stephan, Anne Duran & Dennis L. Clason, The Role of Threat in Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action and Its Beneficiaries, 36 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL.
41, 68 (2006) (finding higher opposition to affirmative action among whites
who believe that such policies threaten their economic and political power,
among other things); Verkuyten, Social Psychology and Multiculturalism, supra
note 196, at 284 (arguing that some whites believe that multiculturalism threatens their group’s dominance).
200
Hillary Haley & Jim Sidanius, The Positive and Negative Framing of Affirmative Action: A Group Dominance Perspective, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 656, 666 (2006) (discussing framing effects); Renfro et al.,
supra note 199, at 69 (discussing relevance of racism and conservative ideology).
201
See sources cited supra note 200.
202
Markus et al., supra note 184, at 243–49.
203
Id. at 243.
204
Id. at 244. See also id. at 246 (discussing surveys showing racial differences in support for colorblindness and multiculturalism).
205
Id. at 242.
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equal opportunity exists in the United States regardless of race; people of
color, however, typically disagree with this position.206 Whites’ propensity to believe that racism no longer matters could operate as a legitimizing myth, designed to validate the unequal distribution of power and resources among persons of color and whites.207 If racism no longer exists,
then any measurable inequality does not result from unfairness, which
might require legislative and judicial remediation. Instead, individual
weaknesses among persons of color or other nonracial variables must
explain contemporary racial inequality. From this perspective, remediation is a privilege or special benefit.
Denying the existence of racism could also stem from a psychological mechanism described as “system justification.”208 System justification refers to “the psychological process by which existing social arrangements are legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group
interest.”209 If individuals convince themselves that existing social arrangements are just, then they will find no need for remedial policies.210

206

Elijah Anderson, Duke W. Austin, Craig Lapriece Holloway & Vani S.
Kulkarni, The Legacy of Racial Caste: An Exploratory Ethnography, 642
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 25, 37 (2012) (summarizing different
views whites and blacks hold with respect to the contemporary significance of
racism); Richard P. Eibach & Thomas Keegan, Free at Last? Social Dominance,
Loss Aversion, and White and Black Americans’ Differing Assessments of Racial
Progress, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 453 (discussing opinion
polls showing dramatic difference between black and white opinions regarding
the existence of racial discrimination); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 918, 919 n.4 (2009) [hereinafter Hutchinson,
Racial Exhaustion] (citing numerous studies finding dramatic differences
among whites and persons of color regarding the ongoing significance of race).
207
See Roger L. Worthington, Michael Loewy, Rachel L. Navarro & Jeni
Hart, Color-Blind Racial Attitudes, Social Dominance Orientation, RacialEthnic Group Membership and College Students’ Perceptions of Campus Climate, 1 J. DIV. HIGHER EDUC. 8, 16 (2008) (finding that white students who
support social dominance have a more positive perception of “general campus
climate” than egalitarian whites).
208
John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in SystemJustification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1994).
209
Id. at 2. See also Cheryl J. Wakslak, John T. Jost, Tom R. Tyler & Emmeline S. Chen, Moral Outrage Mediates the Dampening Effect of System Justification on Support for Redistributive Social Policies, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 267,
267 (2007) (“According to system-justification theory, people adopt ideologies
and belief systems that serve as excuses and justifications for existing social,
economic, and political arrangements at least in part to make themselves feel
better about the status quo.”) (citation omitted).
210
See Wakslak, supra note 209, at 273 (“We assume that people care about
justice, at least to some degree, and are bothered by potential departures from
fairness. In order to maintain their perceptions of the world as just, however,
people do not necessarily strive to make changes that will increase the overall
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In fact, they might even believe that remedial action is unfair.211 System
justification, however, does not rest upon a desire for group dominance.
Instead, it reflects a human need to believe that the society in which one
lives operates fairly.212
4. Whites Are a Vulnerable Social Group
Within the United States, whites began criticizing policies taken to
ameliorate the conditions of racial inequality immediately after the Civil
War and throughout the period of Reconstruction.213 Opponents of remedial policies and civil rights statutes argued that these efforts treated
whites unfairly and transformed blacks into a special and privileged
class.214 This rhetoric of “racial exhaustion”—whites’ weariness with
racial redress—has continued over the course of American history.215
Whites who opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 argued that it would
force employers to utilize quotas and that it would deprive whites of liberty.216 Also, whites have frequently contested affirmative action on the
grounds that it constitutes unfair discrimination against whites.217
Although the idea that remedying racial discrimination harms whites
has informed civil rights debates throughout history, recent studies indicate that whites now feel that they are just as vulnerable to racism as persons of color—or even to a greater extent. In 2011, Michael Norton and
Samuel Sommers published a study that found that whites believe they
are a vulnerable racial group.218 Norton and Sommers polled a national
sample of blacks and whites and asked them to rate on a scale of one to
ten (one representing “not at all” and ten representing “very much”) the
amount of discrimination they believe blacks and whites experienced in
each decade from the 1950s to the 2000s.219

amount of fairness and equality in the system. Rather, they often engage in cognitive adjustments that preserve a distorted image of reality in which the world
is a fair and just place.”).
211
Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a ZeroSum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 217 (2011)
(finding that from 1950s to 2000s and within each decade during this period,
“White respondents were more likely to see decreases in bias against Blacks as
related to increases in bias against Whites—consistent with a zero sum view of
racism among Whites—whereas Blacks were less likely to see the two as
linked.”).
212
Wakslak, supra note 209, at 273.
213
Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, supra note 206, at 928–41.
214
See id.
215
See generally id.
216
See id. at 950–53.
217
Id. at 953–58.
218
Norton & Sommers, supra note 211.
219
Id. at 216.
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The study found that blacks believe antiblack racism has declined
slightly over time.220 Blacks, however, do not believe that whites have
experienced racism to a substantial degree; this position remained virtually unchanged in each rated decade.221 Whites, by contrast, believe that
antiblack racism has declined sharply, while antiwhite racism has increased dramatically—particularly since the 1970s.222 The study controlled for the age and education of participants, but it found no statistically significant changes in the results.223 Also, the study found that
black and white assessments of antiblack and antiwhite racism were
quite similar for earlier decades, but that the measures diverged dramatically from the 1960s and beyond.224 A majority of white participants believe that by the 2000s, antiwhite racism became more prevalent than
antiblack racism.225
Norton and Sommers also found that whites who believe that they
are members of a vulnerable social group are more likely to view racial
equality gains as unfair benefits earned at their expense.226 In other
words, many whites view racism as a zero-sum game; changing the status quo of racial inequality can only occur by treating whites unfairly.227
C. The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Doctrine Mirrors
White Viewpoints Regarding Race
The analysis in the preceding section demonstrates that as a class,
whites tend to favor colorblindness over multiculturalism, embrace individualistic rather than group-based models of social organization, believe that equal opportunity exists in the United States regardless of race,
and feel that they are a vulnerable racial group. This section demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s equal protection doctrine mirrors white
opinion regarding the status of race relations in the United States. Because this Article has already analyzed the Court’s equal protection doctrine in extended detail, demonstrating the congruence of white viewpoints and Court doctrine does not require a lengthy analysis. The
similarities are striking.
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Id.; see also Eibach & Keegan, supra note 206, at 464 (“Cumulatively,
these studies support the argument that the discrepancy between White and nonWhite assessments of racial progress results, in part, from the tendency of some
White Americans to frame advances for racial minorities as threats to their own
status and privilege or, in other words, to their ingroup’s social dominance.”).
221

2015]

A Critique of the New Equal Protection

49

1. Multiculturalism Versus Colorblindness
The Court, like whites, prefers colorblindness to multiculturalism
and race-conscious decision making. Colorblindness is, in fact, the central standard the Court applies in equal protection cases.228 The Court has
refused to apply other theories, such as antisubordination, that legal
scholars have developed.229 The Court has never confronted the reality
that its discussion of social tension within the context of affirmative action and other forms of remedial race-conscious state action responds
primarily to whites’ opinions regarding these policies.230
2. Groups Versus Individuals
The Court, like whites, rejects group-based social models. The Court
has repeatedly held that the Constitution protects individual, rather than
group, rights. The Court has also held that recognition of racial groups
disrupts social cohesion. Consequently, the Court views group-based
remediation, such as affirmative action, with extreme skepticism.231 The
Court’s aversion to group-based equal protection also explains its failure
to recognize a new suspect class since 1977.232
3. Contemporary Relevance of Racism
Although the Supreme Court has never said that racism no longer
exists, several opinions rest on the implicit understanding that the United
States is a post-racial society. First, the Court has made remedying racial
discrimination the most difficult basis for using affirmative action. When
state actors make racial distinctions in order to remedy discrimination,
the Court demands exacting evidence of disparate treatment. Otherwise,
the policy will fail the strict scrutiny test.233 In Adarand Constructors v.
Peña, the Court held that a federal statute’s rebuttable presumption that
minority businesses face social disadvantages must satisfy the strict scrutiny test.234 The Court’s ruling implies that discrimination against racial
228

See supra text accompanying notes 41–56.
See infra text accompanying notes 327–30.
230
See S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans, supra note 5
(“Another difficulty is that the same use of racial criteria may cause race-based
hostility to increase among members of one racial group and to decrease among
members of another racial group. For example, an affirmative action program
may cause more resentment among some whites but less resentment among
some minorities than would exist in the absence of the program. No decision
rule is available to explain how the Court’s judgment about balkanization proceeds in these circumstances.”).
231
See supra text accompanying notes 41–56.
232
See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 755.
233
See Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3,
at 675–77 (discussing the Court’s distrust of legislative findings of discrimination).
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See 515 U.S. 200, 200 (1995).
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minorities occurs rarely, if at all, and that individual businesses must
demonstrate on a case-by-case basis the relevance of race to economic
activity.235
Similarly, in Parents Involved, a plurality of the Court found that the
racial isolation of people of color in public schools does not justify racebased remedies. The Court reached this conclusion by narrowly defining
discrimination in procedural terms. Conditions of racial inequality—
even if they result from state policies—simply do not constitute racial
discrimination. According to the plurality, the only discrimination the
case implicated was the defendants’ efforts to create a more egalitarian
distribution of education resources. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts chides
the dissenters by reminding them that “[t]he way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”236 This
sterile tautology validates pervasive patterns of inequality that negatively
impact students of color. On the other hand, race-remedial policies receive the most rigorous judicial scrutiny to make sure that the state actors do not victimize whites.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy sought to distance himself
from the conservative plurality. Kennedy argued that states have a compelling interest to end the racial isolation of students of color.237 Kennedy, however, voted to invalidate the policies due to the dignity harms
they imposed upon white students.238 Kennedy did not sufficiently consider the significance of the alleged dignity harms whites suffer from
racial classification versus the concrete material harms that students of
color experience because they attend racially isolated poverty schools.239
Although Kennedy tried to carve out a middle ground, his resolution
placed the interests of whites above the needs of students of color.
The Court has even advanced the interest of states’ “dignity” above
the needs of persons of color. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme
Court invalidated the preclearance requirements contained in Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act.240 The preclearance provision mandated that
235

See Spann, supra note 23, at 52 (“The reason that the Supreme Court rejected the congressional presumption is that the Court has adopted a theoretical
vision of the world, where racial minorities are not disadvantaged.”).
236
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007).
237
Id. at 783.
238
Id. at 797 (“To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”).
239
See generally Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and Educational Inequality, THE CIV. RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD
UNIV.(2005), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integrati
on-and-diversity/why-segregation-matters-poverty-and-educational-inequality/o
rfield-why-segregation-matters-2005.pdf (discussing the negative educational
impact of poverty and racial isolation).
240
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (finding current standards for 42 U.S.C. §1973(a)
to be an impermissible intrusion upon state sovereign immunity).
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certain states and jurisdictions within other states receive approval from
the U.S. Department of Justice before they made any changes to their
election laws.241 Congress enacted this provision because these jurisdictions were among the worst offenders of the Fifteenth Amendment at the
time the Voting Rights Act was enacted.242 Congress renewed the Voting
Rights Act in 2006.243 At that time, several lawmakers and public commentators questioned the usefulness of Section 5, arguing that the covered states no longer discriminated on the basis of race.244 Perennial civil
rights opponents Abigail Thernstrom and Edward Blum offered a perspective that Justice Scalia would later repeat during oral arguments seven years later, when they effectively described Section 5 as a handout to
a special interest group. Thernstrom and Blum pleaded with Congress
not to surrender to “Jesse Jackson and other activists eager to wave the
racism flag” and that congressional Republicans are “terrified by . . . the
NAACP, the Lawyers Committee on Civil Rights, and other advocacy
groups.”245 During oral arguments, Justice Scalia, following the lead of
Thernstrom and Blum, infamously described the preclearance provision
as a “racial entitlement,” rather than a sorely needed measure to prevent
ongoing racial discrimination.246 Because Justice Scalia either doubts or
does not care that race continues to harm persons of color, he construes
Section 5 as a naked racial privilege that injures states rather than offering necessary protection to vulnerable classes.247
The Shelby County opinion makes similar claims about the irrelevance of race. Justice Roberts, who also wrote the plurality opinion in
Parents Involved, argued that the Voting Rights Act “imposes current
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Id. at 2615.
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes,
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377,
383 (2012) (“Section 5, the VRA’s other core provision, reaches only ‘covered
jurisdictions’ (states and some localities that once had particularly egregious
records of voting discrimination) and guards primarily against backsliding.”
(citation omitted)).
243
Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting in Today’s Shifting Racial Landscape,
23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 373, 393 (“In 2006 Congress once again substantially
rewrote section 5.”).
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See Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, supra note 206; infra text accompanying notes 298–311.
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Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, supra note 206 (quoting Abigail
Thernstrom & Edward Blum, Do the Right Thing, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2005, at
A10).
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Adam Liptak, Voting Rights Law Draws Skepticism From Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013 (“Justice Antonin Scalia said the law, once a civil rights
landmark, now amounted to a ‘perpetuation of racial entitlement.’”).
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Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invoking a principle
of “a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority” as controlling precedent (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 567 (1911)).
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burdens and must be justified by current needs.”248 Echoing the sentiments of white participants in a recent study regarding the status of United States race relations from the 1950s until the present, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote that “things have changed dramatically” since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.249 The contention of dramatic
racial progress, however, reflects majoritarian views held by whites—not
persons of color.250
The Court also held that because voter turnout in the covered states
has increased substantially, the preclearance formula needs revision.251
The Court, however, fails to consider the numerous laws that primarily
Republican-controlled states, including some subject to preclearance,
have enacted to deprive people of color of the right to vote. These policies include voter ID laws, permissive use of poll watchers who can intimidate persons of color and language minorities, the use of purging
lists that disparately impact persons of color, and felon disenfranchisement.252 Immediately after the Court enjoined the preclearance provision, several Republican-controlled state legislatures introduced bills that
would enact new provisions that scholars believe could disparately impact persons of color.253 While the Court portrays Section 5 as outmoded
because of dramatic improvement in race-relations, the legislative blitz
following the Shelby County decision undermines the Court’s forgiving
analysis of contemporary racism.
If racism was actually negligible in contemporary America, then
Shelby County would arguably contain a defensible doctrine. However,
because racism remains pervasive in the United States, Shelby County
rests on a fictitious vision of contemporary United States race relations.
The case also mirrors the views held by most whites today: racism is a
248

Id. (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
249
Id.
250
Supra text accompanying notes 205–12.
251
Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (“In the covered jurisdictions, ‘[v]oter
turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.’” (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 202)).
252
Jesse Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389
(2011) (discussing methods of felon disenfranchisement); Jocelyn Friedrichs
Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing
voter purge lists); Gilda Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343 (2010)
(discussing forms of voter harassment); Daniel Tokaji, The New Vote Denial:
Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006)
(discussing methods of vote denial).
253
Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/afterSupreme-Court-ruling-states-rush-to-enact-voting-laws.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
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thing of the past, and the nation has virtually ended all racism through
the extension of civil rights to people of color.254 In a post-racial society,
civil rights enforcement and remedies are unnecessary and should be
rare, narrow, and discrete.
4. Whites Are a Vulnerable Social Group
The Court also treats whites as a vulnerable social group. Although
persuasive arguments justify applying a more lenient standard to evaluate the constitutionality of remedial state action that treats whites differently than persons of color, the Court applies strict scrutiny to such policies. At the same time, however, the Court applies ordinary rational basis
review to state action that disparately harms disadvantaged groups, including when these policies occur in policy areas such as education and
criminal justice that served as historical sites of pernicious racial subordination.255
Furthermore, while the Court imposes an exacting intent standard
upon historically disadvantaged plaintiffs, it has shown a greater willingness to find unlawful discrimination in cases brought by white plaintiffs.256 In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court held that a municipal government’s decision to cancel the use of a test used to screen applicants for a
promotion in the city’s fire department violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.257 Even though the test results would have excluded
all black candidates and all but two Latino candidates from the field of
qualified individuals, the Court held that scrapping the test would discriminate against whites.258
Title VII, however, contains an impact standard, and the city argued
that using the test might make the city susceptible to lawsuits.259 The
Court, however, held that the city needed a “strong basis in evidence” for
believing that using the test would make it vulnerable to lawsuits filed
by persons of color, that it could replace the initial test with one that had
a smaller discriminatory impact, and that the initial test was not a valid
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Supra text accompanying notes 204–212.
Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3, at

664.
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Reva Siegel, Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–58 (2013)
[hereinafter R. Siegel, Equality Divided] (discussing inconsistent application of
the discriminatory intent requirement).
257
557 U.S. 557 (2009) (finding violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2009)). Although Ricci is a Title VII case, rather than an equal
protection case, the Court finds intentional discrimination (which is the equal
protection standard), and the defendant is a state actor. Also, the Court analogizes this case to equal protection litigation. Thus, it fits within the general scope of
this Article. See also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582–93.
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Id.
259
Id. at 563–74 (discussing test and city’s decision to discard the results).
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job requirement.260 The extreme disparate effect and the various meetings and legal discussions the city held concerning the test failed to meet
that standard.261 The white plaintiffs, however, prevailed on their claim
of intentional discrimination, despite the fact that hiring and promotion
criteria that disparately impact racial groups, absent some legitimate reason, can constitute unlawful discrimination under federal law.262 Furthermore, the white plaintiffs proved intentional discrimination by relying primarily upon the same statistical pattern of discrimination that the
city used to justify discarding the test.263 The Court chose to extend
greater protection to the white victims of alleged discrimination than it
provided to the black and Latino employees the city tried to shield from
the test’s discriminatory impact. The Court also provided more protection to white plaintiffs than it typically extends to persons of color litigating mere impact claims.264 The Court found intentional discrimination
relying almost exclusively on statistical evidence. This is a great departure from the normal discriminatory intent rule cases. In most discriminatory intent rule cases, the plaintiffs are persons of color; in Ricci, virtually all of the plaintiffs were white.
The discriminatory intent rule, the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to remedial usages of race, and its refusal to find any new suspect
classes, support the observation that the Court has “inverted” the meaning of equal protection.265 The Court now extends greater protection to
privileged classes, such as whites, than it provides to vulnerable classes,
such as persons of color.266 Or, as Siegel contends, the Court’s equal protection doctrine has become “majority-protective.”267
Even assuming that the Court should use a uniform standard for all
racial discrimination claims, the Court has not defended why it should
provide greater protection to whites than it gives to persons of color.
260

Id. at 582–94.
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Id. at 581–85 (conceding disparate impact liability under Title VII but
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would be compelling).
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See Hutchinson, Inversion of Privilege and Subordination, supra note 3
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Although no statistical measure of social and economic well-being supports the argument that whites suffer from racial oppression, a recent
study shows that whites now believe that they experience discrimination
more frequently than blacks.268 Whether the result of intentional or unintended processes, the Court’s equal protection case law reflects this indefensible belief that antiwhite oppression exists in the United States.
Although the Court’s equal protection doctrine offers little hope to
vulnerable social groups, some plaintiffs have successfully asserted dignity-based claims to challenge harmful state action. Despite the possible
positive outcomes in these cases, legal scholars must critically examine
the relative strengths and weaknesses of dignity doctrines versus a robust
equal protection analysis. As the next Part of this Article demonstrates,
dignity-based claims cannot provide the same level of redress to vulnerable groups as an equal protection doctrine that seeks to mitigate rather
than facilitate racial hierarchy.
IV. TOWARDS A “NEWER” EQUAL PROTECTION THAT PROTECTS
SUBORDINATE CLASSES
This Part argues for the development of a newer equal protection. In
light of the informative empirical research conducted by social psychologists, this equal protection doctrine would accommodate group
identity and rights. It would not conflate race consciousness with racism
or argue that the former causes social unrest. The revised equal protection doctrine this Article advocates would recognize the ongoing significance of racism and its impact upon persons of color. This equal protection analysis would not treat whites as a racially subordinate class—a
finding that lacks an empirical basis. Finally, the doctrine developed in
this Part would not enforce the perspectives of whites as a class over
those of persons of color, or of any dominant class over subordinate
groups. In other words, this newer equal protection doctrine would not
facilitate group domination, as does the Court’s current case law.
A. Groups, Difference, and Society
The Court asserts that its reluctance to recognize group-based inequality stems from its fear of balkanization. Yoshino’s groundbreaking
work on this subject contends that the Court and society suffer from
“pluralism anxiety.”269 Assuming Yoshino’s diagnosis is correct, fear of
balkanization does not justify the Court’s retreat from group-based equal
protection.

268
269

Norton & Sommers, supra note 209, at 216.
See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 5.
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1. Healthy Responses to Anxiety
Anxiety has two meanings. The first meaning is used in conversational English, while the second meaning has a clinical dimension. Both
the clinical and nonclinical uses of the word “anxiety” derive from and
connote physical and emotional pain related to some generalized or
amorphous threat.270 Psychiatrists Juan J. López-Ibor and María-Inés
López-Ibor have written quite an extensive article discussing the etymology and present-day meaning of anxiety.271 They chart the evolution
of the term through Greek, Latin, French, and English employing numerous historical sources.272 After a substantial analysis, they conclude
that:
The word anxiety and those that share the same Latin and Greek etymology describe feelings characterized
by deep suffering experienced as being at risk by a notyet-identified threat. The emotion is linked to sensations
of choking, oppression in the chest, lack of breath which
allow us to differentiate anxiety from anguish, and the
sensation of being inhibited (as in anguish) from that of
being uneasy or nervous (as in anxiety). Anxiety is not
only a clinical symptom of many psychiatric disturbances, but also a radical experience of human beings as
substantiated by phenomenological and existentialist
schools of thought, which consider that anguish is the
experience of being thrown into the world.273
Medical professionals typically recommend psychological therapy to
control the irrational and panicked reaction to ordinary stimuli.274 In extreme cases, pharmacological intervention combined with therapy offers
promise.275 Medical studies, however, report that cognitive avoidance, or
efforts to escape anxiety by ignoring the stressor, can actually make conditions worse. People who utilize cognitive avoidance simply add on a
new layer of anxiety: they now worry about avoiding the stressor in ad-
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See generally Juan J. López-Ibor & María-Inés López-Ibor, Anxiety and
Logos: Toward a Linguistic Analysis of the Origins of Human Thinking, 120 J.
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Id. at 10.
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Richard G. Heimberg, Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for Social Anxiety
Disorder: Current Status and Future Directions, 51 SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 101 (2002) (discussing effectiveness of cognitive behavioral therapy for patients with social anxiety disorder).
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Herman G. M. Westenberg & Michael R. Liebowitz, Overview of Panic
and Social Anxiety Disorders, 65 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (Supp. 14) 22, 24
(2004) (concluding that combination therapy and medication might help treat
prolonged cases of social anxiety disorder).
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dition to experiencing the same anxiety that triggered their avoidance
strategies.276 If Yoshino’s anxiety trope is accurate, the Court’s and society’s efforts to avoid racial and ethnic pluralism actually may cause more
serious harm than accepting the multicultural reality of the United States.
Although this discussion of clinical anxiety is intended as a metaphor—just as Yoshino’s use of the term—contemporary equal protection
doctrine, like cognitive avoidance strategies, does not confront actual
societal conditions. Instead, the Court has created a doctrine that rests on
a fictitious portrayal of the United States as a society in which whites are
racially oppressed; multiculturalism is corrosive; group-rights have no
constitutional foundation; and race-based remedies impose the same degree of harm as Jim Crow and slavery. This doctrine does not come close
to providing equal justice. The Court must try a different approach.
A fair equal protection doctrine would rest on empirical research, rather than disproven assertions regarding the status of United States race
relations. The Court should reform equal protection to recognize the
benefits of multiculturalism and harms of colorblindness; inevitability of
a group-based social structure; persistence of racism against persons of
color; and the privileges whites possess in a racially hierarchical society.
2. Multiculturalism Helps Society; Colorblindness Harms Society
Although the Court fears balkanization, empirical research demonstrates that ethnic and racial diversity improves social institutions and
helps to generate mutual understanding and tolerance across social
groups. Some social capital literature, which some scholars and advocates have used to justify the demise of group-based equal protection,
actually finds that multiculturalism generates many social benefits.277 To
the extent that some scholars contend that multiculturalism causes intergroup tension, a much larger number of scholars have refuted this assertion or found that other factors like racial and class inequality more
strongly correlate with or cause intergroup tension.278 Controlling for
these other factors, multiculturalism has very little negative impact upon
social cohesion.279
Social psychologists have conducted studies that find that whites
have a more favorable view of out-groups when they embrace multiculturalism.280 By contrast, colorblindness helps to justify the existing une276
Stefan G. Hofmann, Cognitive Factors that Maintain Social Anxiety
Disorder: A Comprehensive Model and its Treatment Implications, 36
COGNITIVE BEHAV. THERAPY 193, 204 (2007) (finding that a coping strategy
that avoids source of anxiety actually exacerbates the symptoms of the disorder).
277
See supra text accompanying notes 152–66.
278
See supra text accompanying notes 152–69.
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See supra text accompanying notes 152–54, 165–66.
280
See Christopher Wolsko, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd & Bernd
Wittenbrink, Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-
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qual distribution of vital resources.281 Colorblindness operates as a legitimizing myth that defends social dominance and as a form of system
justification that convinces individuals that the United States is a just
society—in spite of deep racial inequality.282
Colorblindness can also make people blind to racism. Researchers
conducted a study that exposed two groups of students to a “multimedia”
storybook.283 The book—which consisted of a series of images displayed
on computers with a narrator—described a third-grade student’s effort to
arrange a class performance to support racial equality.284 The two groups
of students heard the same story, except that the scripts diverged in one
critical respect. One group of students received a lecture regarding the
virtues of colorblindness.285 The other group of children listened to a
lecture that promoted the recognition and appreciation of ethnic and racial diversity.286 A teacher, unaware of the study, then read three scenarios to all of the students. These three scenarios involved student interactions that were nonracist, ambiguously racist, and explicitly racist.287 The
explicitly racist story involved an incident of racist bullying during a
soccer game.288 Researchers asked the students to describe the events
they heard and to state whether any of the three scenarios involved acts
of racial discrimination. The students’ responses confirm the hypothesis
that the promotion of colorblindness can lead to racism-blindness.289

Blind Perspectives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 648–49 (2000) (finding that multiculturalism causes a
more positive perception of out-groups among whites).
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See Kimberly Rios Morrison, Victoria C. Plaut & Oscar Ybarra, Predicting Whether Multiculturalism Positively or Negatively Influences White Americans’ Intergroup Attitudes: The Role of Ethnic Identification, 36 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1648, 1658 (2010) (“Furthermore, colorblind ideologies may reinforce the status quo by legitimating existing inequalities between
White Americans and racial and ethnic minorities.”) (citations omitted).
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See supra text accompanying notes 204–07.
283
Evan P. Apfelbaum, Kristin Pauker, Samuel R. Sommers & Nalini Ambady, In Blind Pursuit of Racial Equality?, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1587 (2010).
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See id.
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Id. at 1588 (The color-blind version called for minimizing race based
distinctions and considerations (e.g., “That means that we need to focus on how
we are similar to our neighbors rather than how we are different,” “We want to
show everyone that race is not important and that we’re all the same”)).
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Id. (“The value diversity version endorsed recognition of these same differences (e.g., “That means we need to recognize how we are different from our
neighbors and appreciate those differences,” “We want to show everyone that
race is important because our racial differences make each of us special”)).
287
Id. at 1588–89.
288
Id. at 1589 (describing racist scenario involving a white student tripping
a black student because he “knew he could tell that [the victim] played rough
because he is Black”).
289
See generally id.
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With respect to the multiculturalism group, seventy-seven percent of
the students perceived racism in the explicitly racist category; forty-three
percent perceived racism in the ambiguously racist category; and zero
percent perceived racism in the control category. On the other hand, students who were primed for colorblindness tended not to report any racist
incidents. Only fifty percent of the colorblind group perceived racism in
the explicitly racist category; ten percent perceived racism in the ambiguously racist category; and zero percent perceived racism in the control
category. The students’ reactions were videotaped.290
The researchers then asked teachers who were unaware of the study
to view the students’ videotaped responses to the incidents and then indicate whether the behavior the children described warranted intervention
by a teacher. The researchers found that the teachers were less likely to
believe that descriptions of ambiguously and explicitly racist scenarios
described by the colorblind group warranted teacher intervention.291
Thus, not only were the students less likely to perceive racist incidents if
they were previously exposed to colorblindness as a value, they were
also less likely to describe the behavior they viewed to their teachers in a
manner that would provoke intervention.292
Although multiculturalism generates many social benefits, it also involves risks. Studies show that whites do not see themselves as participants in racial and ethnic diversity.293 This could result from a tendency
of whites not to see themselves consciously as a racial group or due to
the way some people frame multiculturalism.294 This risk is not insurmountable. Ethnic and racial diversity policies need not preclude whites.
Nonetheless, to the extent that diversity seeks to remedy past discrimination on the basis of race, then de-emphasizing whites is rational, not invidious.295
In addition, intergroup tension is not inherently bad, as the Court and
some scholars suggest. Rather, intergroup racial tension might occur because suppressed minority viewpoints are finally receiving attention
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from the majority.296 Silencing minority views for the sake of avoiding
tension is a self-defeating goal. Forcing racial minorities to embrace
colorblindness, especially within a context of racial inequality, causes
resentment, withdrawal, and other harms.297 When equality and diversity
occur, however, organizations and societies can operate more robustly
and innovatively.298
3. Group-Based Societies and Rights
Social scientists have found that all societies have historically involved group-based hierarchy.299 Also, individuals do not exist outside of
the sociocultural space in which they live.300 Despite the fundamental
relevance of groups to society, the Court sees collective identity and
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Id. at 435 (discussing the risk of tension and conflict from clashing perspectives of dominant and subordinate groups but arguing that tolerating this
tension could “create a reservoir of distinct resources and perspectives upon
which the society may draw in times of need”); id. at 436 (arguing that “conflict
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group”); Lisa Troyer & Reef Youngreen, Conflict and Creativity in Groups, 65
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The Cognitive Costs of Colorblindness on Ethnic Minorities, 48 J.
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multiculturalism are two different avenues to attaining intergroup harmony, our
findings suggest that in short-term interracial interactions, colorblindness may
hurt ethnic minorities’ cognitive functioning”); Victoria C. Plaut, Kecia M.
Thomas, & Matt J. Goren, Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness Better for
Minorities?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 444, 445 (2009) (“Our results suggest that dominant-group members’ diversity beliefs (e.g., multiculturalism and color blindness) have palpable implications for minority colleagues’ psychological engagement. Paradoxically, emphasizing minimization of group differences
reinforces majority dominance and minority marginalization.”); Valerie PurdieVaughns, Claude M. Steele, Paul G. Davies, Ruth Ditlmann, & Jennifer Randall
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Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (finding lowest levels of trust and highest levels of
perceived identity threat among African Americans in environments with low
minority representation coupled colorblind ideology).
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rights as dangerous and inconsistent with American constitutional tradition.301 Both of these contentions are deeply problematic.
A substantial amount of social science data demonstrates that, standing alone, groups do not harm society. Instead, nonrecognition of groups
and the existence of group-based inequality diminish social cohesion. On
the other hand, multiculturalism and the amelioration of social and economic inequality improve social and institutional relations.302
Furthermore, while American culture certainly promotes the idea of
individualism over groups, this cultural tradition falls apart under closer
scrutiny for at least two reasons. First, whites are more likely to accept
individualism over group identity than are people of color.303 So, this
tradition is not exactly “American” when the perspectives of people of
color are taken into consideration. Second, research suggests a more
complicated relationship between the things whites value in their own
lives and their perception of what most whites want. In one study, for
example, a group of white participants ranked the values they deemed
important from their own perspective and the values that they thought
were important for most white Americans.304 The results showed that on
an individual basis whites valued “personal virtues and interpersonal
relationships,” but they “characterized White Americans as placing value
on the cultivation of more specific personal skills . . . and on the acquisition of material rewards.”305
In addition, while the Court views group-based identities as dangerous and balkanizing, social scientists have also demonstrated the essential connection between the individual and society. The self is a social
construct, formed out of interactions and responses to the broader society.306 The Court, however, treats the two categories as mutually exclusive.
Moreover, despite contrary language in some cases, the Court has
never applied a wholesale rule against the recognition of group rights. It
is true that the political theorists who inspired the framers of the Constitution heralded individual liberty, but individual liberty and group rights
are not inevitably inconsistent.307 For example, the Equal Protection
301
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Clause protects individuals from racial discrimination, but the Court applies strict scrutiny to racial classifications due to the history of racial
subordination—not because certain individuals during American history
experienced racial discrimination.308 Racial discrimination, as the Court
has acknowledged, is dangerous due to the widespread oppression it
caused.309 Modern equal protection doctrine evolved, in part, due to the
Court’s desire to protect “discrete and insular minorities.”310 Also, the
Court (and Congress) has specifically recognized group rights in many
legal settings.311 In addition, the Court has frequently limited the rights
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See Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin
Subclassifications: The Context That Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 908
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the Hopi, Navajos, and Cherokees, who are formally recognized by the federal
government and are treated as domestic sovereign entities. Even activist civil
rights organizations have group rights. So, perhaps it is misleading to say that
American law only protects individual rights.”); Ronald R. Garet, Communality
and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1984)
(“Groups receive extensive protection under contemporary constitutional law.
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of individuals in order to accomplish broader societal goals.312 Accordingly, Court precedent does not support the idea that group rights have
no place in American constitutionalism. Furthermore, the spread of
group rights within human rights law and in foreign constitutions provides an additional basis for the Court to rethink its analysis of group
rights in the equal protection context.313
4. Racism Is Still Relevant
Whites tend to view racism as insignificant.314 People of color, on
the other hand, are more likely to believe it remains a substantial barrier
to equal opportunity.315 By every statistical barometer of well-being, race
impedes social and economic betterment.316 Individual and institutional
acts of racism continue; also, the present-day effects of unremedied past
discrimination continue to plague communities of color.317
These observations do not negate the relevance of other social categories such as sex, sexual orientation, or poverty. These findings also do
312
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not imply that every negative event in the lives of persons of color stems
from racism. Instead, these findings mean that equal opportunity remains
elusive for many Americans due to race. To the extent that the Equal
Protection Clause was intended to ameliorate racial oppression, the
Court’s doctrine does not facilitate the achievement of that goal. Even if
original intent is irrelevant, the Court has not even tried to justify its
privileging of white beliefs about race—even those that are patently incorrect from an empirical standpoint—over the values held by subordinate groups.
5. Whites Are Not Racially Oppressed
Although recent studies suggest that whites think that they are a vulnerable racial class, this belief is not true. The same statistics that
demonstrate the subordinate position of persons of color document the
privilege of whites.318 Immunity from the debilitating impact of racism is
a powerful social advantage. Possession of the intergenerational benefits
of racial privilege is also a tremendous asset that advances the economic,
political, and social status of whites.319
This analysis does not mean that whites never experience racial or
other forms of mistreatment. Nor does it mean that any state action that
singles out whites is justifiable. This analysis does, however, imply that
the Court should give private and state actors more latitude to treat
whites and persons of color differently, within reasonable constraints, in
order to remedy pervasive and substantial racial inequality. Whites and
persons of color are not similarly situated with respect to the distribution
of social resources. Racism caused this extreme imbalance. Recognizing
race in order to remedy racial injustice does not constitute racism. That
logic would, by analogy, call into question a policy that freed slaves on
the grounds that doing so would discriminate against people who are not
slaves. The reverse-discrimination legitimizing myth began in the midnineteenth century when Congress began to pass laws to ameliorate the
conditions of racial inequality and slavery.320 It continues to frame argu-
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ments in opposition to racial justice, and it serves as a justification for
the perpetuation of racial inequality.321
B. Towards an Equal Protection Doctrine That Actually Protects
This section argues that the Court should not enable the anxieties
that whites or individual justices have regarding balkanization. Barring a
very catastrophic event, the United States will remain ethnically and racially diverse. An equality doctrine that discounts diversity, groups, and
equality does not reflect the sociocultural landscape of the country.
Moreover, this doctrine increases inequality and tension—the exact opposite outcome of the Court’s stated purpose.322 The most effective equal
protection doctrine for contesting group dominance is antisubordination
theory.
1. What Is Antisubordination Theory?
Many legal scholars have urged the Court to reform equal protection
doctrine by applying antisubordination theory.323 According to antisubordination theory, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the “subjugation
or the formation of a caste structure.”324 Antisubordination theory seeks
to eliminate state action that “imposes or reinforces the social and economic vulnerability of classes of persons.”325
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Because antisubordination theory addresses concrete manifestations
of deprivation, it would not invalidate policies simply because they take
race into account. Instead, antisubordination theory would also permit
state action taken to ameliorate the conditions of inequality, even if it
categorized people by race. Also, rather than following the antidifferentiation approach that the Court currently utilizes, antisubordination theory would treat as impermissible or at least suspicious any state action,
intentional or otherwise, that compels vulnerable social groups to live
“perpetually in social and economic deprivation”—even if those policies
were facially neutral with respect to race.326
Furthermore, as many other scholars have observed, antisubordination theory has tremendous support in constitutional history and tradition. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to invalidate the Black
Codes, which the Southern states enacted to restore racially based slavery.327 The Black Codes were not infamous simply because they mentioned race; instead, these laws offended notions of fairness because they
sought to nullify the Thirteenth Amendment and reenact slavery.328 The
Court’s first opinion that construed the meaning of the Reconstruction
Amendments recognized the antisubordination purpose of these enactments. In The Slaughter-House Cases, the Court found that “the pervading purpose” of the Reconstruction Amendments was the “freedom of
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and
the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him.”329 Today, however, the Court construes the Fourteenth Amendment
as a tool for enforcing white opinions regarding the status of race relations and the appropriateness of race-based remedies. Antisubordination
theory would reject the privileging of dominant social groups.
2. A Few Thoughts About Dignity
Although dignity-based arguments should not supplant equal protection, these arguments are not inherently harmful to social justice. Instead, as proponents of dignity claims have argued, this particular approach has helped vulnerable classes, particularly LGBT individuals,
secure legal victories.
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That dignity claims have the possibility of producing successful outcomes for vulnerable classes does not mean that they should replace
equal protection. Group dominance stems from the unequal possession
of political power and resources. Dignity arguments that rest on liberty
do not require eradication of these distinctions. Instead, in its current
form, the dignity doctrine attends to the emotional or stigmatic effects of
state action. These same concerns, however, have led to the judicial invalidation of numerous policies that were implemented to ameliorate the
conditions of racial inequality.330
Additionally, dignity arguments do not focus on power disparity
among social groups. In fact, legal scholars have praised dignity-based
claims because they make the dynamics of social group relationships
irrelevant.331 It is impossible to remedy the harms of racial inequality,
however, without considering group-based inequality. Some racial injuries resemble stigmatic harms.332 Many others, however, relate to material deprivation.333 Because dignity doctrines do not provide redress for
substantive inequality, they cannot replace a robust antisubordination
analysis.334 Indeed, several dignity cases already reveal the limits of this
doctrine for vulnerable social groups.335 Litigants should certainly use
available doctrines that can help them achieve litigation victories. These
victories, however, should not determine how legal scholars and courts
interpret equal protection, especially if the resulting interpretation sustains group domination.
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CONCLUSION
Neurological studies suggest that people detect skin color very rapidly, in 120 milliseconds, or less than 1/7 of a second.336 Prevailing equal
protection doctrine, however, rests on the fiction that people can become
blind to race. The history of racial oppression should make the Court
sensitive to social policies that categorize individuals according to race.
This same history, however, should also lead the Court to adopt a critical
stance towards policies that justify the systemic inequality of the same
classes of people who, due to historical and contemporary discrimination, occupy the bottom end of America’s racially hierarchical society.
Instead, the Court has taken the opposite approach. The Court has transformed the Equal Protection Clause into a formidable barrier to social
policies that seek to remedy racial oppression. At the same time, the
Court construes the Equal Protection Clause as generally permitting policies that cause significant harm to racially oppressed individuals—so
long as those policies do not mention race explicitly. Furthermore, the
Court has expressed a willingness to depart from its deferential stance
towards policies that disparately affect racial classes when these practices harm whites. The Court has also explained that it must apply strict
scrutiny to policies implemented to ameliorate the conditions of racial
subordination in order to make sure they do not harm innocent whites.
Taken together, the Court’s differential stances towards remedial uses of
race and facially neutral but racially injurious policies help to facilitate,
by design or effect, racial dominance in the United States.
The Court’s equal protection doctrine also implements core beliefs
about race relations that whites hold, while it rejects the positions taken
by most persons of color. The Court prefers colorblindness to multiculturalism as a method of preserving social cohesion; rejects group identity
and favors individualism for social organization; treats racism as a relic
of prior generations; and perceives whites as racial victims. Enforcement
of these beliefs—which an abundance of social science data refutes or
undermines—legitimizes present-day conditions of racial inequality.
Furthermore, while the Court contends that its rejection of group-based
equality claims will boost social cohesion, empirical research shows that
it has the opposite effect. Colorblindness and individualism combined
with racial and class inequality exacerbate social divisions.
Because equal protection doctrine currently offers very little hope to
vulnerable classes, some scholars have looked for alternatives. The
Court’s recent openness to using dignity-based claims to extend protection to vulnerable groups has led some scholars to promote the Due Process Clause as a substitute for equal protection. Although switching to
dignity might generate litigation victories, this doctrinal setting cannot
336
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provide comprehensive relief for the variety of harms that racism causes.
These harms include material as well as stigmatic injuries. The Court’s
dignity doctrine, however, only targets stigmatic and procedural harms;
it does not seek to diminish group-based material deprivation. In fact,
some scholars favor dignity arguments precisely because they do not
require examination of group-based dynamics.
Furthermore, the Court has utilized dignity arguments to invalidate
remedial usages of race. It has ruled that state and federal policies designed to prevent and remedy racial subordination offend the dignity of
whites and state governments, assigning to states a human-like quality.
When confronted with a choice of promoting racial egalitarianism over
inequality, the Court chose the latter.
Application of antisubordination equality theories can help refashion
Court doctrine so that it provides actual protection to vulnerable groups.
Antisubordination theories, however, will continue to face resistance
from an ideologically polarized Court with a majority of justices who
strongly support current approaches to equal protection. Evolution in
Court doctrine will require the same forces that have led to legal changes
historically, including social movement activism, election politics, public
opinion, and cues from the political branches. Legal academics should
contribute to this process by highlighting the role that the Court plays in
preserving inequality and by continuing to craft theories that can inform
equality doctrine in a more favorable judicial climate.
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